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TORT LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, KATRINA, AND 9/11: EXPLORING
LIABILITY FOR EXTRAORDINARY RISKS
Daniel A. Farber∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort cases generally deal with routine risks—the kind of risk that a
person encounters as a result of driving a car or buying a product. Such
risks are also staples of the insurance industry. Today, however, society
faces risks that threaten potentially massive harms to large segments of
the public. Katrina destroyed the city of New Orleans, claiming 1,464
victims1 and causing well over $22.6 billion2 in property damage. Much
of the damage might have been avoided if the city’s flood control system
had performed as designed. A few years earlier, terrorist attacks on 9/11
destroyed the World Trade Center, claiming 2,752 victims3 and causing
over $18.8 billion4 in property damage. Climate change may already be
responsible for tens of thousands of deaths and will ultimately cause
many billions of dollars worth of damage.5
Can tort law strengthen society’s response to these risks? In part, the
answer to this question may depend on whether we see tort law as
exclusively a matter of enforcing private rights, or whether we see it as
also encompassing public law goals such as deterrence and risk
spreading. In any event, judges have begun to confront this question,
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manual/09_earthquake_tsunami.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
5
See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.

1075

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 4

1076 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

with varying results—some have rejected tort claims, based on these
extraordinary risks, as non-justiciable, whereas others have recognized a
basis for liability for failure to take precautions against risks such as
terrorist acts or natural disasters.
Part II of this Article provides case studies of how the tort system has
responded to catastrophic risks such as large-scale flooding, terrorist
acts, and climate change. Liability approaches vary depending on the
problem and jurisdiction, but there is no consistent pattern of immunity
for sources of catastrophic risk. Some courts have shied away from
hearing cases involving massive liability exposure, while others have
stepped up to the challenge.
Part III examines how tort liability for catastrophic risks could
contribute to societal goals of deterring undesirable risks and social riskspreading. As we will see, the risk-spreading goal is particularly
important because of the reluctance of private insurers to cover such
risks. There are other potential responses to this insurance gap, and in
some situations one or another may be superior, but all of them have
flaws that preclude any presumption of providing a superior form of
risk-spreading compared with tort law.
A few remarks about the scope of this Article are appropriate. To
begin, the types of risks discussed in this Article vary considerably, but
they have some important commonalities nonetheless. The situations
involved typically have three major characteristics.
The first
characteristic is magnitude. These events involve either major loss of life
(probably numbered in thousands rather than hundreds), or
extraordinary physical damage and economic harm (on the order of one
billion dollars or more). The second is that the events were, at least
arguably, caused by human activities, or the damages could have been
substantially mitigated through precautionary measures. Otherwise, the
tort system would not be relevant. The third major characteristic is that
these situations evade at least part of the usual systems for managing
risks. For example, asbestos litigation overwhelmed the court system’s
ability to process disputes, while terrorism and natural disasters have
spotty insurance coverage (and what coverage does exist for terrorism
and natural disasters tends to be government subsidized).
There is no recognized term for these situations. We could call them
disasters, catastrophes, or mega-torts. The corresponding risks could be
identified as catastrophic risks or public risks, as opposed to the more
garden-variety risks that the legal system manages on a daily basis
without significant strain.
There are significant variations within this category. Some disasters,
such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, involve dramatic
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discrete events, with enormous damage occurring within a short period.
Others, like climate change or asbestos deaths, take place over longer
periods of time. There are also borderline cases—events with damages
in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than billions, or leakage
from hazardous waste sites (a multi-billion dollar source of clean-up
expenses but not of direct damages).
For present purposes, precisely characterizing these risks is
unnecessary. My goal is not to advocate the adoption of specific rules
about these events or to debate the application of existing doctrinal rules.
Rather, I want to explore the ways in which the legal system has
responded to compensation demands for massive harms and to consider
whether liability in some form would be socially desirable, where
defendants were negligent or otherwise engaged in tortuous activities.6
The tort system obviously cannot be the sole, or even the primary, legal
response to catastrophic risks, but the tort system should be an
important part of the mix.
Given that this lecture is part of a series on tort theory, I should also
say that I understand the term “torts” to not only center on the common
law of torts but also to extend more broadly to other forms of
compensation for harms caused by risky behavior. Thus, I view
legislatively created judicial remedies and even administrative
compensation systems to be tort-like. There are obviously important
institutional questions about when courts should devise compensation
rules and when they should await legislative action, and also about
when judicial remedies are superior to administrative ones. I will touch
on these questions, but they are not my central focus. Rather, my main
interest rests in a more substantive question: is it appropriate to require
those who create extraordinary risks, or fail to take precautions against
them, to finance compensation for those who are harmed?
II. CASE STUDIES
This Part of the Article considers several major types of risks,
including floods, terrorism, climate change, and environmental
contamination. All of these risks can be considered “billion dollar
babies” in terms of their potential scope of liability. These risks differ in
other respects, such as the source of the risk (public entities versus
private firms), the number of defendants, and the temporal profile of the

6
I say “liability in some form” because as discussed in the text, the question of whether
liability should be delivered through the common law tort system or through a statutory
judicial or administrative remedy is not my focus, although I will have something to say
about the potential virtues of the common law as at least a default source of liability.
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risk (one-shot event versus progressive harm). It is useful, however, to
begin with an overview of how tort liability fits into society’s overall
portfolio of strategies for compensating for catastrophic risks.
There is a tendency to assume that these risks are simply too
extraordinary for the tort system to handle, presenting a threat of
unconfined liability that the legal system cannot manage. The response
of the New York courts to a massive power blackout illustrates the
tendency to avoid applying normal liability rules to catastrophic system
failures. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.7 arose from the July 1977 blackout of
New York City. In order to avoid what it considered to be a potentially
crippling level of liability, the court held that liability would be limited
to direct customers of the company, despite the company’s blatant
negligence that affected many other New Yorkers.8
Notably, the court’s response was not to eliminate tort liability but to
try to confine the class of victims in order to control damages. Even so, it
would be a mistake, as discussed below, to assume on the basis of Strauss
that the tort system’s role is insignificant in handling catastrophic risks.
482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 37–38. The plaintiff was injured by falling down a stairwell when the power
went out in the common area of an apartment building. Id. at 35. The fact that the injury
was in the common area was critical because in that part of the building, the landlord,
rather than the tenant, was the customer of the power company. Id. Based on this fact, the
court held that the tenant could not recover, and that any liability from harms caused
would be limited to direct clients of the power company. Id. at 37. The court explained
further:
[W]e deal here with a system-wide power failure occasioned by what
has already been determined to be the utility's gross negligence. If
liability could be found here, then in logic and fairness the same result
must follow in many similar situations. For example, a tenant's guests
and invitees, as well as persons making deliveries or repairing
equipment in the building, are equally persons who must use the
common areas, and for whom they are maintained. Customers of a
store and occupants of an office building stand in much the same
position with respect to Con Edison as tenants of an apartment
building. In all cases the numbers are to a certain extent limited and
defined, and while identities may change, so do those of apartment
dwellers. While limiting recovery to customers in this instance can
hardly be said to confer immunity from negligence on Con Edison,
permitting recovery to those in plaintiff's circumstances would, in our
view, violate the court's responsibility to define an orbit of duty that
places controllable limits on liability.
Id. at 38 (internal citations omitted). The court also applied the same direct customer rule
even when the tenants had an obligation under their lease to compensate the landlord for
electricity: the tenants still were not direct customers of the utility. Milliken & Co. v.
Consol. Edison Co., 644 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1994). Thus, the ironic result may be that
plaintiffs who could recover if only a few people were injured are barred because the
defendant harmed a great many people.

7
8
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Strauss may express caution about sweeping liability for mega-risks, but
this Article demonstrates that courts are not always unwilling to impose
liability.
A. An Overview of Compensation for Catastrophic Risks
Steps can be taken to limit the human impact of natural disasters.
Nevertheless, harm to human life and property cannot be completely
avoided. This raises the question of compensation. The legal system
provides a mix of public and private sector methods for compensating
victims of natural disasters. Each of the methods that have been used to
provide compensation for catastrophic risks has its limitations.
The first method of compensation is private insurance. However,
the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks due to expense or
underwriting risks, exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract, and the
difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims create significant
hurdles.9 The second method of compensation, litigation against
responsible private parties, also has its limitations: the need for proof of
negligence or other basis for liability; limits on the financial assets and
insurance coverage of potential defendants; and other judicial doctrines
limiting recovery.
Third, there is the possibility of obtaining
compensation from the government through various routes: tort claims
against federal or state government for negligence (subject to immunity
defenses); claims under special compensation schemes established for
particular disasters; and claims based on constitutional provisions
requiring compensation for the taking (or in some states, damaging) of
property.
In a sense, it is a mistake to speak of a “system” of compensation for
catastrophic losses. Instead, our society has a makeshift assembly of
jerry-rigged components:
In the final analysis, the U.S. has what might well be
termed a patchwork system for providing financial
compensation for catastrophic loss[] . . . Inevitably, in
such a multifaceted milieu, where the tendency has been
to develop discrete schemes in response to
particularized categories of disasters (or rely on general
welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster
relief in mind), there will be ongoing fine-tuning of the
system and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of
the measures in place. While the description of the U.S.
9

See infra Part III (addressing insurance issues in more detail).
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system may not point to a single best model for
delivering financial compensation for catastrophic harm
in all circumstances, its very complexity indicates the
variety of pathways that might be taken.10
Because of its common law roots, tort law may be well adapted to
filling some of the gaps left in this patchwork. We will now consider
how courts have responded to tort claims regarding various forms of
catastrophic events. This survey covers floods, climate change, disease
(cancer), and a form of war (terrorism)—not quite the Four Horsemen of
the Apocalypse, but certainly bad enough.
B. Flood Risks
Flood risks are a useful place to start because of the diverse
approaches to tort liability for defective flood control systems. California
provides broad liability for governmental entities that own or operate
flood control systems, but the federal government has been granted
broad immunity from liability.
1.

A Case Study: California’s Liability System

California law provides an example of the role that judicially
imposed compensation can play. The California Supreme Court
developed liability rules for levee failures in three cases. These cases are
based in part on the California Constitution’s version of the Takings
Clause, which refers to “taking or harming” of property. It would be a
mistake, however, to marginalize the California cases as involving an
arcane state constitutional doctrine. The California cases use tort
concepts and move without much evident concern between common law
tort and state constitutional analysis. The court’s primary concern seems
to be risk-spreading.
The modern development of flood liability in California began with
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District.11 In Belair, a flood control
levee on the San Jacinto River gave way, flooding parts of the City of San
Jacinto. The California Supreme Court took this occasion to establish a
new rule for determining the state’s responsibility for flood damages,
based firmly on the need to spread the risks created by unreasonably
flawed flood control systems:
Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 303, 356 (Michael Faure & Ton
Hartlief eds., 2006).
11
764 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1988).
10

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/4

Farber: Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Explori

2009]

Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change

1081

Permitting recovery where the public entity's
unreasonable conduct constitutes a substantial cause of
damage to property owners negates the apprehension
commonly associated with a rule of absolute liability—
the discouragement of beneficial flood control
improvements—yet properly compensates for losses
unfairly incurred. . . . Reasonableness, in this context, is
not entirely a matter of negligence, but represents a
balancing of public need against the gravity of private
harm.12
Consequently, the California court created a form of liability for
defective levees, somewhat reminiscent of liability for manufacturing a
defective product:
The reasonableness of the public agency's conduct must
be determined on the facts of each individual case,
taking into consideration the public benefit and the
private
damages
in
each
instance. . . . Inverse
condemnation liability ultimately rests on the notion
that the private individual should not be required to
bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a public
improvement . . . Thus, compensation for damages
incurred as the result of a flood control agency's
unreasonable conduct, measured in light of this
balancing test, constitutes no more than a
reimbursement to the damaged property owners of their
contribution of more than their “proper share [to] the
public undertaking.”13
The second case, Locklin v. City of Lafayette,14 elaborated on Belair’s
reasonableness rule. The Locklin court rejected what it called the “arcane
world of water law” theory that “if a private party had the right to inflict
the damage, the government could assert the same immunity.”15
Instead, the court adopted Belair’s reasonableness test in place of the
earlier rule that had immunized the government on the basis of
traditional property notions concerning the privilege to divert flood
waters. The court in Locklin also attempted to flesh out the Belair test.

12
13
14
15

Id. at 1079 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1079–80 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
867 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 746.
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The court identified two sets of factors. The first set, called, the Albers
factors, include:
“First, the damage to th[e] property, if reasonably
foreseeable, would have entitled the property owners to
compensation. Second, the likelihood of public works
not being engaged in because of unseen and
unforeseeable possible direct physical damage to real
property is remote. Third, the property owners did
suffer direct physical damage to their properties as the
proximate result of the work as deliberately planned and
carried out. Fourth, the cost of such damage can better
be absorbed, and with infinitely less hardship, by the
taxpayers as a whole than by the owners of the
individual parcels damaged. Fifth, . . . ‘the owner of the
damaged property if uncompensated would contribute
more than his proper share to the public undertaking.’”16
To these factors, the court added a second set drawn from Professor
Arvo Van Alstyne’s writings:
(1) The overall public purpose being served by the
improvement project; (2) the degree to which the
plaintiff's loss is offset by reciprocal benefits; (3) the
availability to the public entity of feasible alternatives
with lower risks; (4) the severity of the plaintiff’s
damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the
extent to which damage of the kind the plaintiff
sustained is generally considered as a normal risk of
land ownership; and (6) the degree to which similar
damage is distributed at large over other beneficiaries of
the project or is peculiar only to the plaintiff.17
The Locklin court had no occasion to apply these factors because the
plaintiffs had failed to show what portion of their damages were due to
the actions of the defendants.18 The California Supreme Court did,
however, apply the factors in a third case, Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water

Id. at 749–50 (quoting Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965))
(alteration in original).
17
Id. at 750.
18
Id. at 754.
16
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District.19 The court in Bunch praised the trial judge’s finding of
reasonableness as being based on
a careful analysis of several factors, including the
project’s purpose to divert the potentially dangerous
natural flow in order to prevent flood runoff from
fanning out over the Magnesia Cove alluvial plain, the
public need for the project, the risk of private harm, the
alternatives available to reduce the risk of harm, and the
District’s
overall
fiscal
and
flood
control
20
responsibilities.
The court concluded that the trial judge had appropriately balanced
these factors and found the district’s conduct reasonable.
What had seemed like an arcane subject then became relevant to
many policymakers after the state was required to pay almost half a
billion dollars in damages for a levee breach, making the case infamous
among government officials and civil engineers. Paterno v. State of
California sent shock waves through the state’s flood control community
and attracted attention from those in high office.21 The levee in question
had been accepted by the state as part of its flood control system, but had
been built earlier. The trial judge found that the levee failed due to
seepage and failure of the foundation, exacerbated by the highly porous
materials making up its foundation. In particular,
One of plaintiff's experts, Meehan, characterized the
levee as an inferior, high-risk levee which was poorly
constructed and didn’t meet any engineering standards
that existed any time during its life; it was built on a
935 P.2d 796 (Cal. 1997).
Id. at 809–10. The court summarized the relevant evidence as follows:
Expert testimony indicated the detailed steps the District undertook to
secure expert technical and engineering information on repairing its
facilities and in managing those repairs represented sound engineering
practice. Expert testimony was in conflict as to the engineering
feasibility of the short-term solution of repairing the breach . . . to
restore the preexisting level of flood protection, allowing the District to
devote its remaining resources to developing a comprehensive flood
control plan. But as the Court of Appeal observed, the trial court
reasonably relied on the District’s expert testimony that any attempt to
“quick fix” the problem by realigning the diversion levee and lining it
with stronger material would have failed during Tropical Storm
Dolores.
Id. at 809.
21
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. App. 4th 2003).
19
20
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very unstable foundation which was subject to severe
seepage pressure and offered little resistance to seepage
over the course of its history; the embankment was
composed of loose, sandy material and its composition
and construction were not adequate.
This is an
indictment which the evidence supports.22
The California Court of Appeals found an ample basis for liability.
Again, risk-spreading was central to its analysis, along with a sense that
harm due to a defective flood control system should be internalized as
part of the cost of the flood control project:
In large part our conclusion is based on the fact that the
levee system benefited all of California and saved
billions of dollars, and to require Paterno [the lead
plaintiff] to bear the cost of the partial failure of that
system—a failure caused by construction and operation
of an unstable levee—would violate Locklin. A basic part
of the State’s flood plan was to accept existing levees as
much as possible, to reduce the cost of an extensive,
coordinated, flood control system. The People benefited
from that cost-saving feature. However, the record
shows the State never tested the Linda levee, or
reviewed the records of its construction, to see if it was
as strong as the global plans assumed it was, and the
State even ignored specific warnings about the levee’s
weaknesses. In such circumstance, the costs of the levee
failure must be deemed part of the deferred costs of the
project.23
In terms of the trial court’s reasoning, the appellate court found that
the Sacramento River Flood Control Plan was a sufficient basis for
liability, because the plan incorporated existing levees, such as the Linda
levee, and “assumed the levee met engineering standards[]” despite its
known substandard construction.24 In the court’s view, “[T]he State
22
23
24
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Id. at 861.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 865. The court described the defects graphically:
The global plans assumed the levee met engineering standards, despite
the fact that the records of its construction were public and showed
that mining debris was simply scraped up and heaped, without
compaction, to form the Morrison Grade, which later was raised and
slightly reshaped, retaining the defective core. The State claims “Linda
levee as it existed after the work performed in 1934 was incorporated
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must be charged with knowledge of how the levee was built. It operated
the levee for decades and had ample opportunity to examine it. If it
chose not to do so for fiscal reasons, that would indicate the loss should
be absorbed by the State.”25
The court then turned to a discussion of the Locklin factors.26 In light
of these factors, the court found that the balance clearly weighed in favor
of the plaintiff:
The public received the benefit from the levee without
having to bear the expense of ensuring it met the
designed standards and was capable of carrying the
water channeled to it by upstream features of the
project. That the levee did not break in 1955 or 1964 is
either miraculous or simply indicates “third time pays
for all,” meaning that the earlier high water events
weakened the levee but not enough to cause a failure.
The savings from not correcting the problems with the
levee benefited the State, and it would be unfair to
require Paterno to bear all of the risk of that plan.
....
. . . Like a corroding pipe buried under Santa
Monica or San Diego, the Linda levee was destined to
fail. Therefore, Paterno has borne the deferred costs of
maintenance of the system, which costs should instead
be spread to the public at large, which benefited from
that system.27
Finally, the court held that the state was liable for the construction
defects because it had accepted responsibility for the levee system.

into the finished 1940 work[,] in conformance with the levee design
standards of the day,” but although the improvements may have been
designed to the standards of the day, the trial court found the levee
never met those standards.
Id. (alteration in original).
25
Id. at 871. The court considered that an upgrade to the levee was an effort to improve
its design capacity, and the court did not include efforts to correct defects that prevented
the levee from meeting its design capacity; hence, liability was not barred by the rule
against requiring the state to perform upgrades. Id. at 873–74. This is an important point.
California courts recognize that it is not their proper role to decide on what kind of flood
control system to construct, which involves profound tradeoffs between risk reduction and
cost. Instead, the courts merely insist that the system as a general matter should live up to
the performance that the state has promised the public.
26
Id. at 872–74.
27
Id. at 875–76 (citations omitted).
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“When a public entity accepts responsibility for an improvement, it
becomes that entity’s improvement regardless of who built it.”28
The court’s approach was largely paralleled by another decision
issued at roughly the same time, Arreola v. County of Monterey.29 The
Aerrola decision suggests that knowledge of a risk is a powerful liability
factor:
We conclude that in order to prove the type of
governmental conduct that will support liability in
inverse condemnation it is enough to show that the
entity was aware of the risk posed by its public
improvement and deliberately chose a course of action—
or inaction—in face of that known risk.30
Although the State of California controls the levees, it does not
directly control the development of the floodplains because land use
planning is primarily a function of local government. As a result of
Paterno, local governments could approve unwise floodplain
developments and thereby increase the state’s potential liability, while
facing no liability threat themselves. The California state legislature took
a step toward resolving this problem with the passage of A.B. 70 in
2007.31 The statute requires a local government to
contribute its fair and reasonable share of the property
damage caused by a flood to the extent that the city or
Id. at 876–77 (citations omitted).
122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Six different complaints were filed on behalf
of approximately three hundred plaintiffs as a result of flooding by the Pajaro River. Id. at
44. The plaintiffs alleged that local authorities failed to keep a channel clear, causing a
levee failure. Id. They also alleged that the state had built culverts under Highway 1 that
were too small to drain the flood, resulting in greater damage. Id. After some years of
neglect, serious efforts were made to clear the channel in the early 1990s, but the work that
was done was not enough. Id. at 48. Following a severe storm in March of 1995, there was
a major flood. Id. at 49.
Applying the Locklin factors, the court had little trouble finding the counties liable:
Knowing that failure to properly maintain the Project channel posed a
significant risk of flooding, Counties nevertheless permitted the
channel to deteriorate over a long period of years by failing to take
effective action to overcome the fiscal, regulatory, and environmental
impediments to keeping the Project channel clear. This is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a deliberate and
unreasonable plan of maintenance.
Id. at 57. The state failed to qualify for application of the reasonableness test because its
conduct would not have been privileged at common law. Id. at 62.
30
Id. at 55.
31
A.B. 70 adds section 8307 to the California Water Code.
28
29
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county has increased the state’s exposure to liability for
property damage by unreasonably approving new
development in a previously undeveloped area that is
protected by a state flood control project.32
There is a safe harbor provision if the local government has complied
with new statutory requirements for floodplain development.33 The
touchstone for liability is failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid
exposing the public to risk.
2.

The Federal Scheme

If the levee failure in New Orleans had occurred instead in levees
under the control of the State of California, the victims would have a
good chance of recovering for the destruction of the city. But recovering
from the federal government for the destruction of New Orleans is much
more difficult.34 In the case of Hurricane Katrina, it appears that the
government was quite possibly at fault for failure to prevent the harm.
According to some experts, the federal government was negligent in its

CAL. WATER CODE § 8307(a) (West Supp. 2009).
Under the code section,
“‘Unreasonably approving’ means approving a new development project without
appropriately considering significant risks of flooding made known to the approving
agency as of the time of approval and without taking reasonable and feasible action to
mitigate the potential property damage to the new development resulting from a flood.”
Id. § 8307(c)(3).
31
Id. § 8307(a). Under section 8307(b), the local government’s duty of contribution is
triggered only if the state has been sued for damages. For an argument for expanded
liability of local governments for unsafe development, see Timothy Kzolowski, Dams and
Levees Are Not Enough: The Case for Recognizing a Cause of Action Against Non-Complying
NFIP Communities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2007).
34
In theory, recovery against the State of Louisiana would be another option, but it
seems unlikely to say the least that the state has the financial resources to provide
compensation on a large scale. In addition, state law creates some obstacles to recovery.
Compare Bernard v. Thigpen Constr. Co., 702 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1997), with Bernard v.
Thigpen Constr. Co., 695 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1997), vacated by 702 So. 2d 1387 (La.
1997). The appellate court had approved certification of the class injured in the 1995 flood,
but then the Louisiana Supreme Court set aside the certification after ruling in another
decision that “the existence of individual causation and liability issues as to each potential
class member may so predominate over common issues that class certification is
inappropriate.” Bernard, 702 So.2d at 1387. The appellate opinion is more interesting in
imagining how plaintiffs could come together as a class following a natural disaster.
Louisiana’s prescription period under La. R.S. 9:5624 may bar recovery because some
causes of action may have already expired long before the flood took place. See John J.
Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana, 65 LA. L. REV. 1015 (2005) for
further discussion on this point.
32
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construction of the New Orleans flood control system,35 or at least, it is
clear that the levees did not perform as designed.36
The federal government is generally liable for negligence under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, but only if the negligence relates to the
implementation of a project rather than the basic policy decisions
involved in planning.
Moreover, the federal government enjoys
especially broad statutory immunity for damages caused by flooding.
The Flood Control Act of 192837 provides that “[n]o liability of any
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from
or by floods or flood waters at any place[.]”38 The Act was passed as part
of a congressional response to the great Mississippi flood of 1927.
Congress decided for the first time that the federal government should
play a major part in flood control, which had previously been seen as a
state and local responsibility. The goal of the Act appears to have been
35
For a discussion of these issues, see Daniel A. Farber, et. al, Reinventing Flood Control,
81 TUL. L. REV. 1085 (2007), also available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters
/Farber_et_al.pdf. For present purposes, I will ignore the possibility that climate change
contributed to Hurricane Katrina, and hence to the harm, because of the severe and
possibly intractable problems of proof.
36
An important example of the potential for negligence claims is the failure of the 17th
Street drainage canal floodwall in New Orleans. Based on video recordings, reports by
residents, and tests of the evolution of the failure, a National Science Foundation research
team was able to reconstruct what happened early in the morning of August 29, 2005.
Winds blew over the large oak trees growing near the top of the levees that should never
have been allowed to grow there. The trees’ root balls ripped out significant parts of the
levee toe connected with underground seepage, a defect which also should have been
corrected earlier. A vertical joint opened up at the joint between two sections; the joint
should not have been weaker than the segments it connected. At this point, a deep breach
opened. As the water continued to rise, the walls leaned, opening more breaches. In the
end, the levee, floodwall, and supporting sheet pile were displaced laterally toward nearby
homes by more than forty-five feet.
The fundamental flaw was that the levee was built on unstable soil. Examination of
early maps of the area revealed that bayou tributaries had crossed the canal at the point of
failure. These tributaries were filled with very soft soil that was buried by landfill before
the levee was built. The Army Corps of Engineers did not use sufficient boring samples to
detect the variations in soil stability. Further, the Corps built the levee to a very minimum
standard of safety (1.3) on experience with rural rather than urban topography—that is, use
of a design strength 1.3 times greater than the maximum expected loading. This margin of
safety was too small given the high human and economic costs of a levee failure in New
Orleans. And there were other flaws. Field tests performed in 1965 should have warned
the Corps that the levee itself was having a dangerous effect on underlying soil strengths.
Even earlier, geologic tests performed by the Corps indicated the treacherous nature of the
soil conditions. And the tops of the floodwalls were almost two feet lower than projected
because of subsidence. Even when surveys in 2004 clearly showed that the floodwalls were
not high enough, no corrective action was taken. Thus, the design was not based on best
available information.
37
Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534–39 (1928).
38
33 U.S.C. § 702c (2000).
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to limit the federal government’s financial exposure to the direct cost of
the flood control project. In United States v. James,39 the United States
Supreme Court rejected arguments that the provision was limited to
immunity for property damage and instead emphasized the broad scope
of the statutory language.
This immunity will probably prevent victims of Katrina from
recovering damages from the federal government.40 However, there
may be some exceptions. One important trial court ruling, In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, allows a suit to go forward.41 In the
case, the plaintiffs claimed that the harm was caused by a navigation
project (the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet canal, commonly known as
“MR GO”) rather than a flood control project. The plaintiffs’ lawyers
clearly face an uphill battle. Nevertheless, if the MR GO case is
successful, the plaintiffs could recover billions of dollars.
There is room for considerable debate about whether the failure of
the flood control system was the fault of the federal government, and the
degree to which similar damages would have occurred even if the
system had met its design standards. Victims who have suffered
property damage do receive other kinds of assistance from the federal
government, particularly from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (“FEMA”). The families of those who died in the flood received
nothing from the federal government unless they happened to have
social security survivor’s benefits. If the MR GO litigation proceeds, at
least some survivors and property owners may receive recompense—
and the benefit of a full, objective investigation into the causes of their
losses.

478 U.S. 597 (1986).
As an illustration of the scope of immunity, consider Mocklin v. Orleans Levee District,
877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs brought suit against several defendants,
including the Army Corps of Engineers, for the wrongful death of their son and sought
damages under the Federal Torts Claim Act. Id. at 428. The child had drowned when he
slipped from a sand bar caused by the dredging into one of the flotation channels used to
prevent further flood damage; the Corps had dredged the lake (Lake Pontchartrain) to
make flotation channels during the construction phase of levees. Id. The government’s
defense relied on § 702c. Id. at 428–29. The Court concluded that the child died “from or
by” “flood water” within the meaning of the FCA because the flotation channel where the
plaintiffs’ son died contained water related to flood control; the flood channels were
“inescapably” part of the flood control project. Id. at 429–30.
41
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 471 F. Supp. 2d 684 (E.D. La.
2007).
39
40
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B. Climate Change
Whether excessive emitters of greenhouse gases will be required to
compensate for the harm caused by climate change is unclear. What is
clear is that such claims will be raised in a variety of forums.
The existence of damage has now become nearly incontestable. We
are already faced with a number of adverse impacts from climate
change.
Examples of observed changes caused by human
releases of GHG [greenhouse gases] include shrinkage of
glaciers, thawing of permafrost, later freezing and earlier
break-up of ice on rivers and lakes, lengthening of midto high-latitude growing seasons, poleward and
altitudinal shifts of plants and animal ranges, declines of
some plant and animal populations, and earlier
flowering of trees, emerging of insects, and egg-laying in
birds.42
Sea level rise is one of the most predictable consequences of climate
change.43 Apart from the unknown contribution of glacial melting from
Greenland and Antarctica,44 the simple change in temperature of the
oceans will contribute to thermal expansion, just as increased
temperature causes the mercury in a thermometer to rise.45 As the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) explains,
“Observations since 1961 show that the average temperature of the
global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000 m and that the ocean
42
Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global
Warming Commitments, 32 ENVT’L. L. REP. 10741, 10756 (2002) (footnote omitted).
43
See, e.g., K. Hasselman, et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate Change, 302 SCIENCE
1923, 1924 (2003) (Figure 2) (predicting a two meter increase in sea level under a “businessas-usual” scenario by 2100, but only twenty centimeters under an optimum regulatory
strategy). The effects of sea level rise are discussed in more detail in Susanne C. Moser,
Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise in Maine and Hawai’i: The Changing Tides of an Issue
Domain, in RONALD B. MICHELL, ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2006).
44
The IPCC states simply that “[d]ynamical processes related to ice flow not included in
current models but suggested by recent observations could increase the vulnerability of the
ice sheets to warming, increasing future sea level rise. Understanding of these processes is
limited and there is no consensus on their magnitude.” Contribution of Working Group I
to the Fourth Assessment Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2007: The Physical Science Summary for Policymakers, 17 (2007). However, the IPCC also
reports that uncontrolled warming could result in sea level rises of up to seven meters
(about twenty four feet) from the melting of the Greenland ice sheet alone. Id.
45
Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks. See Hans O. Portner &
Rainer Knust, Climate Change Affects Marine Fishes Through the Oxygen Limitation of Thermal
Toleration, 315 SCI. MAG. 95 (2007).
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has been absorbing more than 80% of the heat added to the climate
system. Such warming causes seawater to expand, contributing to sea
level rise.”46 Moreover, IPCC reports that “[m]ountain glaciers and snow
cover have declined on average in both hemispheres. Widespread
decreases in glaciers and ice caps have contributed to sea level rise (ice
caps do not include contributions from the Greenland and Antarctic Ice
Sheets).”47
These and other harmful effects have provided fodder for litigation.
Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the rise, and the
trend is to hold that potential damage from climate change is a legally
cognizable injury.48 Although the favorable decisions have involved
standing issues or judicial review of administrative actions rather than
damage suits, scholars have begun earnestly to discuss the damage
issues.49
A case filed by the State of California against General Motors
Corporation illustrates the potential for damage litigation.50 In an action
IPCC, supra note 45, at 5.
Id.
48
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); In re Quantification of Envtrl. Costs,
578 N.W. 2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding agency’s quantification of harm
from CO2). See Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum, Federal High Court, Benin, November 14, 2005,
Unreported Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/
case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-nov05-judgment.pdf (condemning natural gas flaring in
Nigeria); Australian Conserv. Found. v. Minister for Planning, [2004] VCAT 2029, available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2029.html (stating at the
international level that greenhouse emissions must be taken into account in planning
decisions). Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that a
nation “is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, to ensure tbat [sic] activities within its jurisdiction or
control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another
state . . . .” This principle is based on the famous Trail Smelter decision. Trail Smelter (U.S.
v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941) (making reference to United States federal common
law. For discussion of the international litigation, see Michael G. Faure & Andre
Nollkaemper, International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate
Change, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2007). A critique of efforts to use the Alien Torts Act as a
basis for climate change liability can be found in Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and
International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2007).
49
See Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil
Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429 (2005); Hari
M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Vincent S. Oleszkeiwicz & Douglas B.
Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants, 27 INT’L
ENVTL. REP. 936 (2004).
50
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment, California v. General Motors
Corp., 2006 WL 2726547, C06-05755 (N.D. Cal.) (filed Sep. 20, 2006). As discussed below,
the suit has been dismissed and is now pending on appeal. It should be noted that climate
change may breed other kinds of damage litigation. For example, if carbon sequestration
technology becomes widespread and carbon dioxide releases take place, there could well
46
47
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filed in federal district court against leading automobile manufacturers,
the state alleges two causes of action for public nuisance, one under
federal common law and one under California law. The complaint
focuses on several key examples of damages. First, the state allegedly
will be required to spend large sums of money on studies and
infrastructure changes to its water systems. The Sierra Nevada snow
pack, which is the source of much of California’s water, has allegedly
been shrinking. This decrease in snow pack is likely to increase flooding
and interfere with the state’s water system. Preventing flooding and
assuring a reliable water supply will require major financial investments
by the state. Second, rising sea levels will cause increased beach erosion
and increased salt infiltration into the Sacramento Bay-Delta, which will
then require increased expenditures to protect the eco-system and the
water supply for much of the state. Third, climate change is impacting
extreme heat events, increasing the risk of injury or death (especially to
the elderly). Finally, the complaint alleges that
[d]ozens of other impacts have begun or are anticipated
with a high level of certainty, including increased risk
and intensity of wildfires, risk of prolonged heat waves,
loss of moisture due to earlier snow pack melt and
related impacts on forests and other ecosystems, and a
change in ocean ecology as water warms.”51
The complaint adds that “[a]ll of these impacts are the subject of State
study and planning, which costs the State millions of dollars.”52
Consequently, California requests that the defendants be held jointly and
severally liable for monetary damages.53
For the moment, however, much of the litigation seems to be
stymied. At present, California v. General Motors Corp. and a similar
be litigation by injured parties. For a discussion of the issues, see Alexandra B. Klass &
Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Caron Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for
Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide (March 2008) (on file with the author), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=alexandra_klass.
51
Complaint, supra note 50, at ¶ 56.
52
Id.
53
Id. at “RELIEF REQUESTED[,]” ¶¶ 1–2. The complaint also requests declaratory relief
as well as attorney’s fees. The complaint in similar litigation filed against public utilities
can be found at 2004 U.S. Ct. Pleadings LEWIX 1910 (July 21, 2004). In terms of injuries, the
complaint alleges rising temperatures (¶ 104), declining snowfall in New England (¶ 105),
growing pubic health threats from increased temperatures (¶¶ 110–11), damage to coastal
resources (¶¶ 112–17), and damage to water supplies (¶¶ 118–20). In the Midwest, the
complaint alleges damage to the Great Lakes (¶¶ 121–27), damage to agriculture (¶¶ 128–
31), and more generally, harm to the states’ ecology, natural resources, and exposure to the
risk of abrupt climate change (¶¶ 132–46).
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lawsuit against electrical utilities are pending on appeal after the district
courts ruled that the political question doctrine precluded the litigation.54
This application of the political question doctrine seems dubious.
Under current doctrine, the political question argument seems
untenable. Baker v. Carr55 limits the political question doctrine to cases in
which there is a textually demonstrable commitment of an issue to
another branch of government, judicially manageable standards do not
exist, or the nation needs to speak with a single voice.56 None of these
See Conn. v. Am. Elec. Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also Cal. v. General
Motors Corp., Cause No. 2006 WL 2726547 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). Reliance on the
political question doctrine seems misplaced here, given the narrow scope of that doctrine
as defined by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, a similar public nuisance suit was
allowed to go forward in North Carolina v. TVA, 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006).
Although the TVA court did not directly consider the political question doctrine, TVA did
invoke separation of powers concerns, and parts of the court’s discussion speak to the
political question issue:
The appropriate level of pollution emissions is a matter, not for only
one or two Branches, but rather for all three Branches of government.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (Sub-chapter 1, Part A of the Clean Air
Act, wherein Congress sets forth “air quality and emissions
limitations”); 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1–50.12 (wherein the Environmental
Protection Agency sets forth “national primary and secondary ambient
air quality standards”); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of
Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th Cir.1989) (discussing the
role of the courts in controlling air pollution). As the Supreme Court
described it, air pollution “is, of course, one of the most notorious
types of public nuisance in modern experience.” Washington v. General
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114, 92 S.Ct. 1396, 31 L.Ed.2d 727 (1972).
The interdependence of the Branches necessary to control and reduce
this national threat is certainly not repugnant to the Constitution, and
refusing to allow TVA to make unlimited emissions decisions under
the protection of a discretionary function exemption would not place
the Judicial Branch in the position of performing tasks more properly
accomplished by other Branches.
TVA, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
55
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56
Baker actually subdivides some of these factors, resulting in a disjunctive list of six:
1.
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department;”
2.
“a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [the issue];”
3.
“the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;”
4.
“the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government;”
5.
“an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made;”
6.
“the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
54
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factors seem to be present in either case. Courts customarily hear
nuisance cases, so obviously there is no textual constitutional
commitment of such issues to another branch of government, nor is there
a lack of sufficient judicial standards in a nuisance case to satisfy Article
III of the Constitution. As to whether the nation needs to speak with a
single voice, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in considering a
statutory climate change issue and finding foreign policy concerns
beside the point.57 What makes the climate change nuisance cases
different from garden-variety nuisance cases is merely that the potential
liability and societal implications are very large.
It was probably scale of the climate change issue that made these
two district judges frantically reach out to the political question doctrine
as a way of dodging the litigation. The district courts’ concern seemed to
be about the magnitude of the issue of climate change and the potential
repercussions of a ruling for society as a whole.58 But the Supreme Court
has never found the magnitude of the remedy or the societal impact of a
case to be reasons for holding it non-justiciable, and the Court clearly
considers at least some aspects of climate change to be justiciable.59 Of
course, in the end, five Justices can rule however they wish on how to
define the political question doctrine, but in the meantime, existing
doctrine provides little basis for dismissing the suits.
Assuming the suits are held to be justiciable, the plaintiffs will still
face major hurdles.60 Among the challenges are potential statutory
Id. at 217. In the text, I have packaged 2 and 4 together as variants of the manageable
standards factors, and 3, 5, and 6 as involving the need for the nation to speak with one
voice.
57
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (considering a statutory climate
change issue, and finding foreign policy concerns beside the point).
58
For example, in the California case, the district court cited the global implications of the
issue:
Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with sufficient explanation or
legal support as to how this Court could impose damages against the
Defendant automakers without unreasonably encroaching into the
global warming issues currently under consideration by the political
branches. Because a comprehensive global warming solution must be
achieved by a broad array of domestic and international measures that
are yet undefined, it would be premature and inappropriate for this
Court to wade into this type of policy-making determination before the
elected branches have done so.
General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *10.
59
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the
federal government on a statutory issue relating to climate change, and the Court ruled in
the plaintiffs’ favor on the merits. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
60
For analysis of the liability issues, see Bradford C. Monk, Civil Remedies, in Michael B.
Gerrard, Global Climate and U.S. Law 183, 200–13 (2007); Kenneth B. Alex, California’s
Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in CREATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE
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preemption arguments, defining the standard of care and the recipient of
the duty,61 and proof of causation and damages. These questions are
difficult, but not necessarily insurmountable if science fills some of the
gaps in the plaintiffs’ cases.
The proof issues in climate tort litigation may be susceptible to
scientific evidence, if not now, then soon. It is difficult to link specific
harmful events to climate change, which is why we will probably never
know whether Hurricane Katrina was an effect of climate change. But at
least in some instances, the fingerprint of climate change may be more
discernible.
An important, if not shocking, example of the effects of climate
change is provided by a recent European heat wave. A heat wave in
2003 caused over ten billion dollars in economic losses and up to 35,000
deaths in Europe.62 The scientific evidence now seems to establish by at
least a preponderance of the evidence that these deaths were due to
climate change. Scientists estimate that climate change increased the
odds of such an event by a factor of four to ten over the “base rate.”63
The IPCC has also concluded that “the excess deaths of the 2003
heatwave in Europe are likely to be linked to climate change.”64 Thus, it
seems quite possible to tie at least some specific adverse effects to climate
change with considerable confidence.65 Clearly, additional problems
remain,66 in particular, deciding how to allocate responsibility among a
large number of greenhouse gas emitters. But that problem is not
necessarily unsolvable.67

ENVIRONMENT (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denis Antolini eds., 2007) (Alex heads the state of
California’s climate litigation team).
61
On this issue, see David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007).
62
See Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence
on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1388–89, 1398 (2007).
63
Id. at 1392.
64
Ulisses Confalonieri, Human Health, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptability
and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 307 (2007). For further discussion of heat
waves and climate change, see Ann E. Carlson, Heat Waves, Global Warming & Mitigation, in
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, CATASTROPHIC RISKS: PREVENTION, COMPENSATION, AND
RECOVERY (2007): Article7, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art7.
65
If a negligence standard is applied, it would also be necessary to show that if
greenhouse emissions had been kept to reasonable levels, the heat wave would not have
occurred. Current scientific analysis does not seem to have addressed this point, but it
seems feasible to do so.
66
Problems include determination of the standard of liability and various preemption
arguments that may prevent the courts from reaching the merits.
67
For some thoughts about cost allocation, see Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate
Change Costs, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (2007).
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The district judges who found the issue to be a political question
were worried about the manageability of the litigation and its potential
for expansive social impacts. It is not hard to imagine that these
concerns might resurface again in different doctrinal guise if courts are
ultimately faced with the merits issues, perhaps in the form of rulings
that carbon dioxide emitters do not owe a duty of care toward the
victims of climate change. Climate change is a very long-term problem,
and it seems unlikely that the liability issues will be definitively settled
for some time, regardless of the outcome of the present litigation.
C. Large Scale Environmental Contamination and Toxics Exposures
Courts have also been confronted with difficult problems of
causation and long time lags in cases involving widespread
contamination issues.68 These cases demonstrate some lessons for
catastrophic torts more generally.
1.

The Proximate Cause Problem and Medical Monitoring

In many situations involving toxics exposures, the biggest barrier to
tort recovery is proof of causation. Even when a general link between a
disease and exposure to a substance has been established, it may be
difficult to show that a particular individual’s disease was caused by
exposure to that specific substance:
Specific causation requires a plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
caused that particular plaintiff’s harm. Many courts
interpret the preponderance standard to require a
relative risk ratio of 2.0 or greater—for example, a
defendant’s conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s
risk of injury. . . . Thus, if an epidemiological study
indicates that exposure to a particular substance
increases the incidence of a disease among those
exposed by only forty percent, then a court will probably
find that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of

Despite these difficulties, plaintiffs have had some degree of success, as exemplified in
a 2004 settlement in which Dupont paid $340 million to settle a class action, including $235
million in medical monitoring expenses. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Complementary Roles
of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and Using Policy-Relevant Scientific
Information, 36 ENVTL. L. 1026, 1045 (2007).

68
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proving specific causation unless more direct evidence is
offered.69
There is considerable scholarly support for a different approach to
probabilistic harm. Rather than providing full compensation for victims
whose probability of causation is over fifty percent and none for those
who fall under this threshold, this approach would provide proportional
recovery to all victims.70 Thus, if there is a sixty percent chance that a
victim’s injury was caused by exposure to the toxic chemical, the victim
would receive compensation for sixty percent of her damages. Similarly,
if the victim had only a twenty percent likelihood of causation, twenty
percent of the damages would be compensable. However, courts have
not seemed to follow the lead of those commentators who have
suggested proportional recovery.71
It may sometimes be possible to prove specific causation,
particularly when a toxic substance greatly increases the background risk
of a disease. An additional problem though is that even when a plaintiff
is known to be at risk, diseases such as cancer may have long latency
periods. Courts have provided some limited relief to these at-risk
plaintiffs in the form of compensation for the expense of medical
monitoring.
The prevailing approach to medical monitoring is illustrated by In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation.72 The Third Circuit held that a medical
monitoring claimant must prove four elements: (1) that she was
significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the
Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449–50 (2005) (footnotes omitted). For further discussion on this issue,
see Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 28 cmt. B, rep. Note
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 6, 2005).
70
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); William Landes & Richard
Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 417
(1984); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relation of Cause of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982).
71
One way of recovering for what amounts to a risk of future harm takes the form of
stigma damages to property, where the possibility that exposures will be dangerous
allegedly becomes translated into the value of the property. See Dealers Mfg. Co. v. County
of Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 2000) (allowing stigma damages for property that is
merely close to contaminated property); Chance v. BP Chemicals, 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio
1996) (requiring some type of physical damage or interference with use as a predicate for
stigma damages).
72
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d 35 F.3d 717, 784–88 (3d Cir. 1994). A useful analysis of
this remedy can be found in Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the
Problem of Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975 (2002). Abraham points out that the duty to pay for
medical monitoring can be seen as akin to the duty to rescue a person whom the defendant
has tortuously placed in danger. Id. at 2002.
69
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defendant’s negligence; (2) that as a proximate result she suffers an
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) that the
increased risk makes medical examinations reasonably necessary; and (4)
early detection and treatment of the disease is possible. In most medical
monitoring cases, plaintiffs have sought or courts have awarded
traditional common-law lump-sum damages. In a few toxic exposure
cases, however, litigants have pursued, or courts have expressed their
preference for, periodic payment of future medical surveillance expenses
out of a court-supervised trust fund or similar mechanism.73
The Supreme Court dealt with medical surveillance liability a decade
ago in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,74 a case arising under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).75 The plaintiff had been
exposed to asbestos as a pipe fitter while working for the railroad. After
he learned that he faced an increase risk of cancer, he sought to recover
damages for the resulting emotional distress and a lump-sum recovery
for future medical check-ups. The Court noted a number of general
concerns about allowing recovery for medical monitoring not connected
with any existing injury, including the potentially wide scope of liability,
the lower priority of claimants with monitoring costs versus those with
already realized injury, the difficulty of identifying what extra
monitoring is warranted by an exposure, and the possibility that
monitoring expenses would be covered by health insurance or some
other source. The Court’s observations suggest some unease with
medical monitoring damages in general. Ultimately, however, the
Court’s holding was narrow and rejected only what it considered to be a
very broad rule of recovery of lump-sum damages:
We have not tried to balance these, or other,
competing considerations here. We point them out to
help explain why we consider the limitations and
cautions to be important—and integral—parts of the
state-court decisions that permit asymptomatic plaintiffs
a separate tort claim for medical monitoring costs. That
being so, we do not find sufficient support in the
common law for the unqualified rule of lump-sum
damages recovery that is, at least arguably, before us
here. And given the mix of competing general policy
73
See Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1992). The
leading case on medical surveillance is Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
74
521 U.S. 424 (1997).
75
Employers’ Liability Acts (Federal Employers' Liability Act) (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51–60
(2007).
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considerations, plaintiff’s policy-based arguments do not
convince us that the FELA contains a tort liability rule of
that unqualified kind.
This limited conclusion disposes of the matter before
us. We need not, and do not, express any view here
about the extent to which the FELA might, or might not,
accommodate medical cost recovery rules more finely
tailored than the rule we have considered.76
Unfortunately, a few state courts seem to have misinterpreted this
limited holding as a broad rejection of medical monitoring expenses.77 In
any event, this and other cases indicate that the Supreme Court is
unlikely to be on the cutting edge of expanding tort liability.
Medical monitoring is a form of preventive action, and some courts
have used public nuisance law to provide compensation for the expenses
of other kinds of preventive measures. One example is lead paint, a
widespread form of environmental contamination that poses special
risks to young children. The use of lead paint in housing was prohibited
in 1978, but 24 million housing units still contain the paint and its
resulting lead dust.78 In the past decade, state and local governments
have had some successes in public nuisance suits against the lead paint
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 444. The Court’s lack of sympathy to tort
plaintiffs is fairly palpable here—not the willingness to dispose of the case on a ground that
the court says is only “arguably present” in the case before it. In addition, as the dissent
pointed out, the majority’s discussion is extremely muddled:
It is not apparent why (or even whether) the Court reverses the Second
Circuit's determination on Buckley's second claim. The Court of
Appeals held that a medical monitoring claim is solidly grounded, and
this Court does not hold otherwise. Hypothesizing that Buckley
demands lump-sum damages and nothing else, the Court ruminates
on the appropriate remedy without answering the anterior question:
Does the plaintiff have a claim for relief? Buckley has shown that
Metro-North negligently exposed him to “extremely high levels of
asbestos,” 79 F.3d, at 1341, and that this exposure warrants “medical
monitoring in order to detect and treat [asbestos-related] diseases as
they may arise.” Id., at 1346. Buckley's expert medical witness
estimated the annual costs of proper monitoring at $950. Ibid. We do
not know from the Court's opinion what more a plaintiff must show to
qualify for relief.
Id. at 448 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted) (footnote omitted).
77
See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1712 (2007).
78
See Katie J. Zoglin, Getting the Lead Out: The Potential of Public Nuisance in Lead-Based
Paint Litigation, in CREATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, 340–42.
76
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manufacturers.79 In Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Ass’n, after the trial
court upheld a public nuisance claim, one defendant settled for almost
twelve million dollars, and the others were eventually found liable for
abatement costs (possibly in the one billion dollar range) after a jury
trial.80 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also allowed a suit to go forward
despite the plaintiff’s inability to identify the source of the paint for
particular houses.81
Most recently, the California Court of Appeals upheld public
nuisance claims against the lead-based paint industry.82 The court held
that a private class action for damages was foreclosed as being
essentially a products liability case in disguise, but that the government’s
action for abatement of the nuisance could proceed. Relying on the
California lead paint case, County of Santa Clara, as well as other
authorities, a New York federal district court upheld public nuisance
claims against manufacturers of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MBTE), a
gasoline fuel additive.83 Summarizing California law, the district court
said:
While it is true that “the law of nuisance is not intended
to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability,”
California courts have allowed nuisance claims to
proceed where the manufacturer’s or distributor’s
actions have “created or assisted in the creation of the
nuisance.” Such actions, however, must amount to more
than simply the manufacture or distribution of the
defective product—rather, a defendant must take other
“affirmative acts” that contribute “directly” to the
nuisance. Importantly, a failure to warn regarding the
dangers of a product, without more “activity directly
connected” to the creation of the nuisance, is an
insufficient basis for nuisance liability. But where a
defendant engages in more substantial conduct
79
In New York, there has been successful litigation premised on the theory that the
manufacturers engaged in deceptive marketing regarding the safety of the paint. See City
of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 660 N.Y.S. 2d 422 (App. Div. 1997).
80
Zoglin, supra note 78, at 350–54.
81
City of Milwaukee v. NL Indust., Inc., 691 N.W. 2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Quoting
and endorsing the city’s argument, the court’s definition of public nuisance included three
elements plus public policy: “(1) harm occurred to the public; (2) defendants were a
substantial factor in causing the harm; and (3) abatement of the cause of the harm was
reasonable.” Id. at 892.
82
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (2004).
83
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ester (MTBE) Products, 457 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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contributing to the nuisance, liability may well be
appropriate.84
The district court then concluded that active promotion of the
product satisfied the requirement for public nuisance liability. Note that
the remedy in these cases is clean-up—not an award of damages for
harm caused to children who are exposed to the paint.
As the examples of medical monitoring and lead paint clean-up
indicate, remedial innovation is one way to deal with the issues posed by
major risks. An analogy in the climate change area would be to provide
compensation for adaptation expenses or, more narrowly, for monitoring
and forecasting the local impacts of climate change.85
2.

Oil Spills

Another facet of catastrophic risk litigation is presented by litigation
for oil spills. Oil spill litigation is less likely to turn on causation-infact—the damage is often immediate and unmistakable—than on
proximate cause (or alternatively, the existence of a duty toward the
plaintiffs). For instance, in Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,86 the plaintiffs were
consumers who alleged that the Exxon Valdez oil spill had resulted in
higher oil prices. The flaw in their claim was the existence of intervening
causes:
In this case, the spill itself did not directly cause any
injury to the appellants. Rather, plaintiffs alleged the
spill triggered a series of intervening events, including
the decision of the United States Coast Guard to close
the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts; the
alleged decision by refineries in the western United
States to raise prices rather than to use their own oil
reserves to make up any shortage; and the decision of
wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these
price increases.87
The Benefiel court concluded that the “plaintiffs themselves alleged
the existence of at least one intervening act causing the price hike: the

Id. at 463–64 (footnotes omitted).
For an argument that these costs are an appropriate basis for compensation, see
Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605
(2007).
86
959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.1992).
87
Id. at 807.
84
85
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alleged decision of California oil refiners to exploit the supposed
shortage.”88
Benefiel was only one piece of the massive litigation arising out of the
Exxon Valdez spill, however.89 More than a hundred law firms were
involved in over two hundred suits, involving more than thirty thousand
claims. The total damage claims exceeded fifty billion dollars. Although
some of these claims were settled or dismissed, more than ten thousand
remained. Some of these claims were foreclosed by the rule of Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,90 which requires that a person must suffer
direct physical harm in order to recover economic losses. On the other
hand, there is a recognized exception to Robins for commercial
fishermen. This exception covered fisheries actually closed to fishing by
the spill, including claims that the market value of their later salmon
catch was decreased on the Japanese market because of concerns about
contamination.91 Beyond the direct economic effects of the spill, Alaska
natives also sought compensation for the disturbance caused to their
way of life. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that these damages
were not compensable because the plaintiffs failed to show “special
injury.”92
88
Id. at 808; see also Adkins v. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liab. Fund, 101 F.3d 86 (9th
Cir.1996) (applying the Benefiel test to lost profit claims by electrical utility, cafe, tourist
businesses, and boat repair companies).
89
For an overview of the litigation, see Deborah S. Bardwick, Note, The American Tort
System's Response to Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259 (2000). The author, Bardwick, concludes that despite its magnitude,
the recovery for the plaintiffs was inadequate:
Based on the vast extent of litigation and multi-billion-dollar
judgments awarded against Exxon, a casual observer might acquire an
impression that the legal system fully compensated the losses suffered
by those impacted by the spill. However, the legal system in fact
denied redress to many plaintiffs who lost most of their livelihoods as
a result of damage to natural resources. Many plaintiffs also did not
receive compensation for non-market-based, intangible values that the
resources had given them.
Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). She calls for “statutes that are specifically written to address
the legitimate claims of individuals who suffer significant economic loss as an indirect
consequence of the disaster, and create a right for native groups to recover for the actual
full extent of their harm from loss of a subsistence lifestyle.” Id. at 289.
90
275 U.S. 303 (1927).
91
For a more in depth discussion of the Robins rule, see Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for
Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Spill, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1994).
92
In re Exxon Valdez: Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir.
1997). The court reasoned:
Admittedly, the oil spill affected the communal life of Alaska
Natives, but whatever injury they suffered (other than the harvest
loss), though potentially different in degree than that suffered by other
Alaskans, was not different in kind. We agree with the district court
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Section 1006(d)(1) of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act93 provides that the
measure of natural resource damages is:
(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or
acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural
resources;
(B) the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration; plus
(C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.94
These costs are to be assessed with respect to restoration plans,
which are to be promulgated by federal or state trustees. Double
recoveries are precluded by subsection (d)(3). Section 1006(e) requires
the President to issue damage assessment regulations. Pursuant to those
regulations, a rebuttable presumption of correctness will apply to
damage determinations.
One of the components of damages under section 1006 is the cost of
restoration. Arguably, only restoration can fully compensate the public
for loss of a natural area.95 Unfortunately, one of the lessons of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill is that our capabilities in the area of restoration are
still quite primitive, and may sometimes be counterproductive.96
Paralleling the CERCLA regulations for natural resource damages,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”)
developed equivalent rules under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.97

that the right to lead subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska
Natives. While the oil spill may have affected Alaska Natives more
severely than other members of the public, “the right to obtain and
share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and cultivate
traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine
natural surroundings” is shared by all Alaskans. The Class [of
Alaskan Natives] therefore has failed to prove any “special injury” to
support a public nuisance action.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
93
Oil Pollution Act (OPA), Pub. L. No. 101-380, Title I, § 1006, 104 Stat. 494 (Aug. 18,
1990).
94
33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (2007).
95
See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration As The Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1991).
96
See Marguerite Holloway & John Horgan, Trends in Environmental Technologies: Soiled
Shores, SCI. AM., Oct. 1991, at 100.
97
40 C.F.R. pt. 112 Appendix F (2008). These rules were upheld in Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court found the Ohio ruling decisive
regarding the general legitimacy of contingent valuation. Id. Any claims that a particular
contingent valuation was performed without adequate safeguards could be addressed in a
later enforcement proceeding. Id. at 773–74.
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One lesson here is that damages to natural resources are not
impossible to fix even when the resources have values that are not
captured by markets. Oil spills are a frequent cause of such damage, but
floods can also injure public resources like parks or wetlands, and such
damage is likely to result from climate change. The problem of
identifying the responsible parties may be daunting in the climate case,
but at least the means of measuring the harm to nature are well
established.
3.

Asbestos

And then there is the problem of asbestos. In principle, asbestos is
just another form of environmental contamination, but the special
significance of asbestos litigation warrants separate treatment. The scale
of asbestos litigation has been extraordinary, and it is surprising that the
asbestos issue has not received more sustained attention from legal
academics. As of 2002, according to a RAND report, approximately
730,000 people had filed claims, and at least 8,400 entities had been
named as defendants, though most defendants were in eight key
industries.98 One prominent epidemiological model estimated over
200,000 asbestos-related cancer deaths from 1985 to 2009.99 This is a
horrendous death rate: think of three 9/11 incidents per year for over
twenty years. Of course, the deaths lacked the drama of even a single
9/11, perhaps accounting for the lack of public attention to the issue. If
the asbestos cases had been combined into one lawsuit, the scale of the
catastrophe would have indeed been more apparent, but the large
number of cases and their special and temporal diffuseness prevented
full attention to the scale of the asbestos disaster.
The resulting litigation has had a huge economic impact. Total
spending on the litigation through 2002 was about seventy billion
dollars. About one third of the spending was in the form of defense
costs, another quarter went to plaintiffs’ costs and fees, and the
remaining forty percent went to compensate plaintiffs.100 As of mid2004, at least seventy-three defendants had filed for bankruptcy.101 In a
recent development, W.R. Grace sought the approval of a bankruptcy
court to settle all asbestos claims against it for three billion dollars, with

STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv–xxv (2005).
Id. at xix–xx. The RAND researchers found some empirical confirmation for the
model. Id. at 18–19.
100
Id. at xxvi.
101
Id. at xxvii.
98
99
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deferred payments being guaranteed by fifty percent of the company’s
common stock.102
The legal system has seemingly been unable to find an appropriate
procedural mechanism for handling this flood of litigation. Efforts to
consolidate the litigation have been frustrating. In Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor,103 the Court rejected an ambitious effort to use the class action
mechanism to settle the claims. The Court held that certification of the
settlement class was improper because the interests of some class
members were inadequately represented. The question of how to handle
claims that have not yet matured has also plagued state courts. In a
number of courts, unimpaired plaintiffs are allowed to file claims that
are then relegated to the deferred docket; cases can come off the deferred
docket only if the claimant meets specified medical criteria such as a
diagnosis of malignancy.104
There have been a number of other attempts at procedural
innovation. Some judges have engaged in large-scale, non-class action
consolidations, with fourteen of these consolidated cases involving
hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of claimants.105 For instance, a
Baltimore state judge heard more than eight thousand claims against
more than a hundred defendants.106 The largest known consolidated
trial, involving 9,600 plaintiffs, was held in a specially constructed
courtroom at the Jackson County Mississippi state fair grounds.107
Consolidation of this number of claims can involve great confusion; for
example, one appellate court noted that it was uncertain just how many
claims had been decided at trial.108
In another effort at consolidation, federal courts have attempted to
use the bankruptcy reorganization process as a way of settling massive
numbers of claims, in a substitute for the class action procedures rejected
in Amchem.
Efforts to use prepackaged reorganization plans
(“prepacks”) have run into some of the same difficulties that plagued the
class action mechanism.109 The situation cried out for congressional
attention, but no legislative solution was forthcoming.

W.R. Grace to Pay Estimated $3 Billion to Settle Present, Future Asbestos Claims, 39 ENV.
REP. (BNA) 707 (April 22, 2008).
103
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
104
CARROLL, supra note 98, at xxi.
105
Id. at xxii–xxiii.
106
Id. at 33.
107
Id.; see id. at 38–41 (listing large-scale trial consolidations).
108
Id. at 43.
109
See In re Combustion Engineers, 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting pre-pack plan as
inequitable and lacking statutory authorization).
102
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The asbestos litigation is a cautionary tale about the difficulties
confronted by the legal system in handling a massive number of claims.
Some leadership from the Supreme Court, either through more
aggressive interpretation of current law or through its rulemaking
powers, might have led to a more effective procedural mechanism for
handling the asbestos cases. With legislative assistance, however, some
of these barriers may be surmountable. An American Bar Association
report recommends the following procedural reforms for post-disaster
litigation:
To improve judicial effectiveness in such cases courts
should be granted authority: (a) to concentrate decisionmaking power in a single or small group of judges
consistent with the right to jury trial; (b) to locate the
proceedings in a single court or limited number of
courts; (c) to designate a single set of legal principles to
govern consistent with due process and applicable law;
(d) to requisition adequate resources and personnel; (e)
to utilize reasonable latitude in fact-finding consistent
with the right to jury trial; (f) to take such steps as will
streamline and speed the adjudicatory process; and (g)
to recognize the propriety of pro rata and other forms of
partial awards where necessary.
Authorization to
undertake such steps should be the subject of enabling
legislation.110
Any detailed discussion of procedural reform for mass harms is
beyond the scope of this Article. This is a subject of active interest by
procedural experts, with significant recommendations for change from
the American Law Institute.111 For our purposes, it suffices to say that
the asbestos litigation should be regarded as setting a floor—a level of
110
American Bar Association, Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster (Sept. 2007),
Principle 6 (commentary), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ruleoflaw/rol_
disaster.pdf. The text of Principle 6 provides: “To the fullest extent permitted by law the
persons affected by a major disaster should be compensated for their losses through
insurance coverage and the operation of the judicial system.” Id. Principle 7 provides:
Government payment of compensation or additional assistance to
persons affected by a major disaster should be considered when
government is either implicated in the major disaster or public
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so.
Principles of equal treatment, due process and transparency should
govern the distribution of compensation and disaster assistance.
Id.
111
ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Discussion Draft No. 2).
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process that we already know how to deliver—rather than as a ceiling on
what the litigation system can accomplish.
D. Terrorism
Completing our survey of the worst hazards of modern life, we turn
to terrorism. Prevention has been the primary focus of attention, but
compensation issues have not been ignored. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, Congress established a special
victim’s compensation fund.112 Compensation was limited to individuals
who were present at the crash site and who suffered physical injury or
death.113 The statute covers medical expenses, loss of earnings, “loss of
business or employment opportunities[] to the extent recovery for such
loss is allowed under applicable State law,” and non-economic loss such
as physical and emotional pain.114 Victims also had the alternative of
going through the tort system, but tort recoveries were limited to the
insurance coverage of the defendants, spurred by fears that allowing
otherwise might cause litigation to cripple the airline industry.115
A special master was appointed to administer the fund. The special
master issued a regulation to govern claims that in some instances
seemed to go significantly beyond the statutory language.116 Although
the statute called for an offset for life insurance and pension benefits, the
special master reduced the offset to the extent of the individuals’ policy
payments or pension contributions. The special master also set a floor of
approximately $300,000 on economic recoveries. He established a
guideline for economic loss, based on age, family size, and recent
earnings, with a cap for the highest-level incomes. The special master
also created a schedule for non-economic losses, with $250,000 to each
victim, and $100,000 each to close relatives. Apparently, the special
master’s strategy was to “closely enough approximate the range of tort
compensation to make no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that
could not be refused by most eligible parties.”117 As it turned out,
112
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001) (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000 & Supp. 2005)). For an overview of the
scheme, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10. For criticism of the 9/11 compensation scheme,
see Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the
Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006).
The opt-out cases are now being considered in federal district court, along with claims for
respiratory damages.
113
49 U.S.C. § 40101.
114
Id. § 402 (5), (7).
115
Id. §§ 408, 201(b).
116
See 67 Fed. Reg. 11233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2008)).
117
Rabin and Bratis, supra note 10, at 341.
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ninety-seven percent of the surviving families applied to the fund, with
only seventy families opting out.118
It would be a mistake to think that the harms of terrorism can be
redressed only through such a legislative compensation mechanism.
Common law liability has also been a real factor. Two recent cases
indicate the potential for liability.
Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp.119 involved the hijacking of a Kuwait
airlines flight. Four terrorists boarded a Middle Eastern Airlines
(“MEA”) flight in Beirut. The flight ended in Dubai, where the four
terrorists connected with a Kuwait Airways flight bound for Karachi,
Pakistan. Three American diplomats were also on board the second
flight. Shortly after take-off from Dubai, the terrorists hijacked the plane,
which landed in Tehran. The plane sat on the airport tarmac for days
while the terrorists tortured the three American diplomats, finally
murdering two of them.120 The surviving diplomat and the estates of his
two deceased colleagues brought suit against MEA. They claimed that
MEA’s negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and deaths
occurring aboard the Kuwait Airways flight. The court held that a jury
could have reasonably found that when Kuwait Airways boarded
118
The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000), is another example of a
compensation scheme designed to limit tort litigation in order to protect a critical industry.
The Act caps the total liability of the nuclear industry for damages resulting from a single
nuclear accident, in return modifying normal tort rules to make it easier to establish
liability. The purpose of the statute was to enable the nuclear industry to obtain insurance
coverage. The Act also provides for assessments of the industry as a whole to cover
additional victim compensation. The Supreme Court upheld the Act against a takings
claim in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). For further
discussion of the statute, see Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation
Legislation?—The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
A more recent scheme was enacted to protect pharmaceutical companies from claims
relating to possible bioterror attacks. At the end of 2005, the President signed the Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREPA”). 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d–e (2006). The
statute provides immunity (for anything less than willful misconduct) for pharmaceutical
manufacturers for producing vaccines and other countermeasures for a biological
emergency such as a bio-terror attack or pandemic flu outbreak. The Secretary of HHS
seems to have broad discretion in declaring such an emergency. Once an emergency is
declared, a “Covered Countermeasure Process Fund” is established. No appropriations
will be provided until after the emergency is declared and the fund is established. Thus,
there is no guarantee that funding will be forthcoming, which could leave victims in the
position of having their tort remedies preempted but without any alternative means of
compensation. See Brian Kurt Copper II, Higher and Dry? The Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (April 11,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896299. For a
discussion of these statutory compensation schemes, see Robert Rabin, The Renaissance of
Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 698 (1995).
119
89 F.3d 117 (2nd Cir. 1996).
120
Id. at 119.
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connecting passengers in Beirut, it knew or should have known that
some might be terrorists.121
The first major issue in Stanford was the existence of a duty owed by
Kuwait Airlines to the plaintiffs. The court held that MEA had a duty to
protect passengers on connecting flights from unreasonable risks. The
court found it irrelevant that the victims were not passengers on an MEA
flight because of the nature of the risk.122
A related issue was the foreseeability of the specific injury that
occurred. In this case, there was evidence that MEA knew of the
threatened attacks by Hezbollah terrorists and that terrorists were
boarding flights in dirty airports to infiltrate other airlines.123 Moreover,
even a child would have been suspicious of the unusual behavior of the
four hijackers who boarded in Beirut. A reasonable person could surely
foresee a risk of hijacking from passengers who purchased last-minute
tickets with cash, checked no luggage for a flight from the Middle East to
the Far East, and took a bizarrely circuitous route.124 A jury could
reasonably find that the zone of risk stretched at least as far as the
innocent passengers aboard flights with which the four hijackers would
eventually connect.125
The second case, In re September 11 Litigation,126 involved opt-outs
from the compensation fund. The defendants included the airlines,
airport security companies, and airport operators. All were accused of
negligently failing their security responsibilities.127 In addition, the
plaintiffs accused the owners and operators of the World Trade Center of
negligently designing, constructing, maintaining, and operating the
buildings, as well as botching the evacuation.128 Airline passengers also
sued the plane manufacturers for manufacturing inadequate cockpit

Id. at 124.
Id. at 124–25. Indeed, the evidence suggested that the risk was fairly obvious. The
plaintiffs demonstrated that MEA was aware of the weak security at the Beirut airport. For
instance, the Lebanese military had, but did not use, metal detectors, and X-ray equipment
was unavailable. Id. at 120. In the court’s view, a jury could reasonably find that MEA
knew or should have known of the danger that terrorists would try to board their airline
only to transfer later to a vulnerable, interline target airplane. This was particularly true
because of heightened political tensions and an ongoing terrorist campaign that posed
continuing threats against Americans and Kuwaitis. Id. at 124.
123
89 F.3d at 125.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
127
Id. at 288.
128
Id. at 288, 298.
121
122

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 4

1110 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

doors, which allowed the hijackers to invade the cockpits and take over
the aircraft. 129
The court held that the airlines and security companies owed a duty
of care to victims on the ground to screen passengers and their
belongings, and that the plane crash was within the class of foreseeable
hazards outcomes. Similarly, the WTC’s owners and managers had a
duty to implement adequate fire safety measures, even in the case of a
fire caused by hijackers.130 Likewise, the court found that the terrorists’
unauthorized entry into the cockpit was not unforeseeable and did not
constitute an “intervening” or “superseding” cause that could, as a
matter of law, break the chain of causation proceeding from defective
design of the cockpit doors. 131
Duty was once again a key issue. The court balanced several factors:
the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the
proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like
liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public
policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of
liability.132 The court emphasized that in today’s world, people depend
on others charged with special duties to protect them. 133 For instance,
passenger screening is performed for the benefit of passengers and those
on the ground.134 More generally, New York courts have found that
aircraft owners and operators owe a duty to those on the ground who
may be harmed or sustain property damage resulting from improper or
negligent operation of an aircraft.135
The court then turned to an inquiry regarding “disproportionate risk
and reparation allocation.”136 Airlines, airports, and security firms could
best control the boarding of airplanes and guard against hijackings and
129
Id. at 287–88. Because Virginia does not recognize strict liability for product defects,
the counts against the airplane manufacturers were dismissed as to the victims of the
Pentagon crash. Id. at 306.
130
Id. at 300.
131
280 F. Supp. 2d at 308–10.
132
Id. at 290–92.
133
Admittedly, the court said, New York courts have been cautious about imposing
liability for failure to control the conduct of others because of practical concerns about
potentially limitless liability and about unfairness. But courts have imposed a duty based
on the defendant’s control over the third party tortfeasor’s actions, or a relationship with
the plaintiff requiring the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others. Id.
at 290–91.
134
Id. at 294–95. The court relied in part on the Stanford case for the proposition that
airlines have a duty not only to passengers on the flights they operate but also to
passengers on connecting flights, and thus may be liable when they allow terrorists to
board planes. Id. at 295.
135
Id. at 294–96.
136
Id. at 293 (quotation marks omitted).
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the dangers they present to crew, passengers, and those on the ground.
The court explained,
The scope of duty to a particular class of plaintiffs
depends on the relationship to such plaintiffs, whether
plaintiffs were within a zone of foreseeable harm, and
whether the harm was within the class of reasonably
foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent. . . .
In order to be considered foreseeable, the precise
manner in which the harm was inflicted need not be
perfectly predicted.137
Plaintiffs also have the ability to pursue claims against terrorist
organizations and their supporters. For instance, in Gilmore v. Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority,138 the plaintiffs were the family of the
victim of a terrorist shooting in Jerusalem. They brought suit against the
Palestinian authority as well as some individual defendants who were
allegedly responsible for planning and carrying out the shooting. The
court dismissed the individual defendants for lack of personal
jurisdiction, but allowed the charges against the Palestinian Authority to
go forward.
Liability was based on a federal statute that authorizes claims
against perpetrators of international terrorism, provided three elements
are met. First, the defendant’s activities must involve violent acts that
would violate U.S. criminal law if performed in America. Second, the
acts must “appear to be intended” to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, to influence government policy, or to change a government’s
conduct through mass destruction.139 There is an exception for “acts of
war,” but despite the common term “war on terror,” this exception has

Id. at 295. Turning to the owners and operators of the World Trade Center, the court
also concluded that a duty of care existed. The plaintiffs and society could expect them to
follow applicable safety and fire codes and to create appropriate evacuation routes and
procedures. They were best able to guard against the risks of fire, and their liability
exposure was limited by statute to their insurance coverage. Id. at 293–94. The court also
held that plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded alleged proximate cause given the defendants'
knowledge of the possibility of terrorist acts, large-scale fires, and even airplane crashes at
the World Trade Center. Id. at 296. On the other hand, the court pointed to the possibility
that the acts of the terrorists might be considered an intervening cause, depending on the
evidence at trial. Id. at 292 n.7 & 293.
138
422 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2006).
139
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Pub. Law. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (Nov. 5, 1990),
amended by Pub. Law. No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 376 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006)).
137
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been held inapplicable to al Qaeda because it is not a national military
force.140 The statute provides for treble damages, and courts have
upheld damage awards in the $100–200 million range (which may or
may not ever be collectable, of course).141
Statutory liability also extends to those who aid and abet terrorist
actions. In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development,142 the parents of an American killed in Israel by
Hamas sued Islamic charities that allegedly helped fund Hamas. The
Seventh Circuit held that merely funding Hamas was not enough to
establish liability.
Even small donations made knowingly and
intentionally in support of terrorism are enough for liability. As the
court explained,
[T]here would not be a trigger to pull or a bomb to blow
up without the resources to acquire such tools of
terrorism and to bankroll the persons who actually
commit the violence. Moreover, the organizations,
businesses and nations that support and encourage
terrorist acts are likely to have reachable assets that they
wish to protect. The only way to imperil the flow of
money and discourage the financing of terrorist acts is to
impose liability on those who knowingly and
intentionally supply the funds to the persons who
commit the violent acts.143
Given the prevalence of terrorism in today’s world, we have not seen
the last of claims against those who have failed to provide adequate
protection, as well as those who may have provided material assistance
to terrorists. The preliminary indications are that courts are open to
finding liability where the potential for terrorist acts is sufficiently
foreseeable.
III. THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF TORT LAW
As we have seen, damages for defective flood control are readily
available under California law against the state government, but far
140
Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333–34 (D. Utah 2006). See also Estate of
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D.D.C. 2006) (exception does
not apply if defendant’s actions violated the laws of war).
141
See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 282 (1st Cir. 2005) ($116 million);
Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 442 F. Supp. 2d 62, 77–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ($192 million in
damages); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1337–38 (D. Utah 2006) ($102 million).
142
291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
143
Id. at 1021.
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more difficult if not impossible under federal law when the defendant is
the Army Corps of Engineers. Environmental claims have amounted to
billions of dollars, whether from oil spills, asbestos, lead, or other
dangerous substances. Claims based on terrorist acts are beginning to
find a receptive judicial audience. In short, the judicial system has
responded in a variety of ways to claims for catastrophic losses.
In considering the desirability of compensation for catastrophic risks,
we need to think broadly about the societal interests at stake. The tort
system—and by extension, other compensation schemes—has several
goals.144 Probably the two most important are deterring harmful conduct
(the efficiency or deterrence rationale) and corrective justice (restoring
moral balance by rectifying harm). Loss distribution (which can be
considered a way of providing insurance against social risks) is another
goal, perhaps more important in social compensation schemes than in
tort. Finally, there are goals oriented to maintaining social cohesion —
providing redress for social grievances or exhibiting social solidarity
with victims.145
The present discussion will be limited to fault-based liability. The
concerns about imposing liability for large-scale public risks are
formidable enough in any event. If courts are willing to surmount those
barriers, it seems likely that they will usually require some kind of
showing of fault rather than imposing strict liability. In addition,
liability for catastrophic risks poses a significant likelihood of insolvency,
a situation in which economic analysts say strict liability can lead to
under-deterrence.146 Thus, for present purposes, we can assume that the
conduct is of a kind that society would like to deter—or at least, activity,
the volume of which society would like to decrease—and that at least
some actor’s conduct was responsible for the harm in question.
Moreover, catastrophic losses are precisely the kinds of risk for which
loss-spreading, through some kind of insurance scheme, seems most
warranted. Yet, private insurance coverage for victims is problematic.
Thus, the arguments for negligence liability or some similar faultbased theory may seem clear. But, as we shall see, some significant
difficulties remain to be confronted.
For discussion of these goals, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS
TORT LAW 14–20 (2d ed. 2002). For a more general discussion of how these goals have
shaped the role of government, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT
AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 253–91 (2002).
145
For an insightful discussion of this solidarity rationale in the context of catastrophic
natural events, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating Disaster
Victims, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, available at www.bepress.com/ils.
146
See Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 29 LAW AND POL’Y 339, 342–43 (2007).
144

OF
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A. Deterrence
A core function of tort law is to deter undesirable conduct.147
Defendants in catastrophic risk cases are generally organizations, given
the unlikelihood that an individual defendant will have the assets to
provide more than a trivial amount of compensation.148 Presumably,
business enterprises are likely to take a more rational approach to
potential liability than ordinary individuals. The ordinary assumption of
tort law is that businesses respond to such liability incentives.
Governmental organizations are not profit-maximizing institutions,
but still large tort awards require fiscal dislocations that are not likely to
be politically popular. Thus, government organizations also have an
incentive to avoid conduct that can lead to liability, although this motive
probably must compete with other political incentives.
The deterrent function of tort law is reinforced by the organizational
dynamics regarding catastrophic risks. An individual’s mistake may be
the immediate cause of a catastrophic failure, but there is often a deeper
organizational flaw that makes that mistake possible and prevents it
from being corrected.149 Avoiding catastrophic risks can be a challenging
task for organizations. Many organizations engage in activities that can
cause massive harm if things go wrong—just consider electrical utilities
that operate nuclear power plants, government agencies that build flood
control systems, and operators of blood banks. To prevent devastating
accidents or to take adequate precautions against other causes of
disaster, organizations must be alert for minor unexpected events that
may be harbingers of larger risks; they must react decisively when
mistakes occur to reform the systems which made the mistakes possible.
They also need to track comparable issues at other organizations to learn
from their mistakes and their precautions.
None of this comes very naturally to organizations, which often find
it easier to perfect existing routines, optimizing their behavior under
“normal” conditions but creating little capacity to detect or respond to
the abnormal. This stagnation is especially dangerous for organizations

147
Abraham, supra note 72, at 16. For some misgivings about the efficacy of tort liability
as a deterrent, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
148
Of course, it is conceivable that an individual defendant might have extraordinary
personal wealth, although so far this has not yet been the case in any of the reported cases
involving catastrophic loss.
149
Consider, for example, the organizational flaws that lead up to 9/11. See The 9/11
Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States 339–60 (2004).
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that deal with major emergencies such as floods, fires, and other natural
and manmade disasters.
Organizations that await major failures before adapting tend to enter
crisis mode and find learning and response even more difficult.150 For
example, following the demise of the space shuttle Challenger, NASA
faced political pressures, inertia, and resource constraints that expedited
some organizational changes but made other structural and cultural
adjustments more difficult.151
Furthermore, in the absence of a
significant environmental change or destabilizing event, social science
research indicates that lessons learned in organizations often tend to be
forgotten or misapplied.152
Even worse, because of the infrequency of major disasters, trial and
error learning may lead organizational members to forget lessons from
past disasters. Social scientists contend that in the case of disaster
preparedness, trial and error processes lead to “superstitious
learning[]”—organizational
leaders
concluding
that
resources
designated for disaster preparedness are idle and should be applied
elsewhere.153 Disaster preparation calls for a different form of learning in
which organizations draw on not only their own experiences, but also
those of other organizations. Such network learning exists for a variety
of learning processes.154
Tort liability may promote this process of institutional learning in
two ways. First, it multiplies the number of times the lesson of any
particular catastrophic event is repeated. Individuals learn about the
causes of a catastrophic failure when it happens, again when the lawsuit
is filed, and yet again when the judgment is entered. The later stages,
like booster shots for a vaccine, reinforce the initial knowledge of an
organizational disaster. Second, tort liability enlists new organization
members in disaster prevention. There is some evidence that involving
K.H. Roberts, P. Madsen, & V. Desai, The Space Between in Space Transportation: A
Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS 107, in ORGANIZATION AT THE LIMIT: LESSONS FROM
THE COLUMBIA DISASTER 81–98 (M. Farjoun & W. Starbuck eds., 2005).
151
HOWARD E. MCCURDY, INSIDE NASA: HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE IN THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM (1993).
152
Pabli Martin De Holan & Nelson Phillips, Remembrance of Things Past? The Dynamics of
Organizational Forgetting, 50 MGMT. SCI. 1603 (2004); James G. March, et al., Learning from
Samples of One or Fewer, 2.1 ORG. SCI. 1 (1991).
153
Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 319, 335
(1988).
154
See, e.g., Christine M. Beckman & Pamela R. Haunschild, Network Learning: The Effects
of Partners’ Heterogenity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 92 (2002);
Joel A.C. Baum & Paul Ingram, Survival-Enhancing Learning in the Manhattan Hotel Industry,
1898–1980, 44 MGMT. SCI., 996 (1998); Linda Argote et al., The Persistence and Transfer of
Learning in Industrial Settings, 36 MGMT SCI. 140 (1990).
150
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multiple organizational units can facilitate organizational learning.155
Because of the potential scale of liability, shareholders and others with
financial interests—including management officers with stock options—
have an interest in ensuring that the company does not implode due to
disaster liability. No politician wants to be responsible for bankrupting
the government. Moreover, the legal department in the organization
also acquires an interest in ensuring that steps are taken to avoid
liability. Thus, a broader set of organizational viewpoints are brought to
bear on disaster prevention activities.
Recent events in California illustrate how liability can focus
organizational attention.
The threat of liability helped spur the
Governor’s proposal for a “massive” levee improvement program in the
Central Valley, which faces dire flood risks.156 A Central Valley
newspaper summed up the situation:
For the last four years, California leaders have lived with
the reality that state taxpayers could become liable for
billions of dollars in damages the next time a stateowned levee fails in the Central Valley.
Such levees protect more than 200,000 homes and $47
billion in property, according to state figures.
Potentially, a single flood could bankrupt the state.
In recent years, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and state
lawmakers have poured millions of dollars into levee
repairs and have helped pass two bond issues that will
deliver another $4.9 billion. Those expenditures will
help reduce the flood risk, but by themselves, they won't
fully shield the state from legal exposures caused by
recent court decisions.157

See Christina Fang, Jeho Lee, & Melissa A. Schilling, Exploration and Exploitation: The
Influence of Organizational Structure on Organizational Learning (March 2007), available at
http://mackcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/TMiniPapers07/Fang%20Lee%20Schilling_Explor
at&Exploit.pdf.
156
Editorial, Give Local Governments a Share of California's Levee Liability, OAKLAND (CAL.)
TRIB., April 6, 2006. Confirming awareness of the Paterno decision by political leaders, a
state legislator is quoting as saying, "I think it is going to have long-lasting and rather
severe financial effects on the state of California." Id. Hurricane Katrina undoubtedly also
had an effect in bringing flood issues to the attention of California lawmakers.
157
Editorial, Flood Flip-Flops: Where does Governor Stand? State is on the Hook for Massive
Damages; Local Governments Need to Share in Risk, SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY,
March 11, 2007. The editorial notes that the Schwarzenegger administration initially called
155
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This episode confirms the more general arguments that prospective
liability for catastrophic risks can have a salutary effect on organizational
priorities.
That individuals respond to incentives is an article of faith among
economists, who also tend to view businesses, if not governments, as
rational actors. In any event, it is hard to believe that potential liability
increases the amount of risky behavior by large organizations.
Presumably, organizations do not get to be large without being able to
respond, at least crudely, to the incentives presented by their
environments. Thus, at least as a working assumption, we can proceed
on the basis that tort liability has at least some beneficial incentive effect
even on large organizations.
B. Corrective Justice
Scholars vigorously debate whether corrective justice—the idea of
“just deserts”—has an independent role in tort law, as well as how to
define that role.158 In any event, many people do share the intuition that
wrongdoers have a moral duty to compensate their victims. Application
of this intuition to catastrophic risks can involve difficulties, not because
of the absence of wrongdoing, but because the defendants are typically
entire organizations rather than the individuals directly involved in
causing the harm.
Admittedly, the case for compensation as a form of “just deserts” is
strongest when compensation is provided by the particular individuals
who are responsible for harm, or when responsible individuals have
benefited from conduct that imposes risk on others. With large-scale
risks, this may be difficult because of the way responsibility is diffused
through organizations. Furthermore, the specific individuals who were
at fault for a catastrophic loss often lack the resources to cover more than
a small (and perhaps even trivial) portion of the damages. The question,
then, is whether it is appropriate to impose liability on the organization
and indirectly on stakeholders or taxpayers, even though they were not
immediately involved in the harmful conduct and may not even have

for new tort statutes and a state constitutional amendment to modify Paterno, but later
retreated from that stance. Id.
158
For some classic early contributions to the debate, see Richard A. Posner, The Concept
of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981); George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Law, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). For an effort at
synthesis, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997). A good summary of ideas about corrective
justice can be found in Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 443–51 (1990).
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been aware of the risk. There is a vigorous debate on this issue,
particularly in the context of corporate criminal liability.
In some cases, tort liability can be justified on the basis of unjust
enrichment. If shareholders have benefited because the company has cut
corners on safety, they clearly should make recompense. The same is
true for those who enjoyed lower taxes because their government failed
to take necessary precautions. But such unjust enrichment may be
difficult to show, particularly when there is a significant lag between the
wrongful activity and the materialization of the risk. For instance, the
original shareholders who benefited from the lower costs of shoddy
construction may already have sold out at a handsome profit to new
shareholders who had no knowledge of the risk.159
Some moral theories go beyond this kind of individualistic approach
and hold groups liable regardless of the individual situations of their
members.160 We might think, for example, that citizens accept moral
responsibility for the actions of their governments in return for the right
to participate in democratic politics and receive the benefits of
government actions, or that government as entities should be considered
to have moral rights and responsibilities, or that they suffer from a moral
taint from being associated with their government’s wrongful acts.
Exploring these questions in depth, however, would take us too far
afield. Even if such theories do not make an affirmative case for liability,
they may at least be strong enough to convince us that shareholders and
taxpayers do not face an injustice when they incur financial sacrifices
due to liability.
Under many circumstances, “just deserts” may provide a less
powerful reason than deterrence for imposing liability for catastrophic
risks. Nevertheless, it may sometimes be an important supporting
factor, particularly when stakeholders have received benefit from
wrongful acts that they had the capacity to control.161
C. Risk Spreading
Risk spreading can provide a powerful justification for liability for
catastrophic risks. Understanding this point requires an understanding

159
I discuss this and other aspects of corrective justice in the context of climate change in
a forthcoming article, Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate
Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377.
160
For discussion of those theories, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for
Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 703–11 (2003).
161
For a discussion of this issue in the context of climate change, see Daniel A. Farber,
supra note 159.
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of the complicated relationship between catastrophic risks, insurance,
and government intervention.
Flood damages provide a good starting point. Although the federal
government generally has no legal liability, even if floods are caused by
its negligence, it has often found itself in the position of bailing out flood
victims with various forms of disaster relief. The flood insurance
program is intended both to regularize this practice and to provide
incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit their risk exposure.
The basics of flood insurance have been succinctly summarized by
FEMA:
In 1968, Congress created the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) in response to the rising cost of
taxpayer funded disaster relief for flood victims and the
increasing amount of damage caused by floods.
. . . Nearly 20,000 communities across the United States
and its territories participate in the NFIP by adopting
and enforcing floodplain management ordinances to
reduce future flood damage. In exchange, the NFIP
makes federally backed flood insurance available to
homeowners, renters, and business owners in these
communities. 162
Flood insurance presents a tricky set of problems.163 If it is priced
too high, people simply may fail to insure. If it is priced too low, society
is in effect subsidizing individuals to build in high-risk areas.
Obviously, the solution is to price it “just right”—but finding the right
level may not be easy, especially since there is no private market to use
as a benchmark. Moreover, communities have not always followed
through on promises to control development in flood plains—recall from
Part I that California has found it necessary to create a liability threat in
order to motivate better floodplain planning.

162
FEMA, About Flood Insurance, available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.
fema?id=18921.
163
For fuller discussion of issues relating to flood insurance, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM
CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 178–84 (2006); Edward Pasterick,
The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF
INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther &
Richard J. Roth eds., 1998).
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Private insurance for catastrophic risks also presents distinctive
issues.164 As Steve Sugarman explains:
. . . Indeed, it is precisely the dramatically large event
that leads to widespread disastrous consequences that is
frequently specifically excluded from certain standard
private insurance policies. For example, the destruction
of one’s home or other buildings is generally not
covered by ordinary property insurance (or
homeowners’) policies if the harm is caused by things
like war, nuclear radiation, floods, and, at least in some
places, earthquakes.165
Demand for such insurance may be low because people misjudge the
likelihood of low-probability events; they may also prefer to incur larger

164
For more in-depth coverage of issues relating to private insurance, see Dwight M.
Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Terrorism Rethinking the Government's Role Insurance, in ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, CATASTROPHIC RISKS: PREVENTION, COMPENSATION, AND RECOVERY
(2007): Article 5, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art5; Howard Kunreuther,
Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2006); HOWARD KUNREUTHER AND RICHARD J. ROTH, SR., PAYING THE
PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1998).
165
Sugarman, supra note 145, at 6 (footnote omitted). Sugarman explains some of the
reasons why private insurers may be reluctant to enter this market:
First of all, they find themselves unable to sensibly price the insurance,
both because the precipitating event too infrequently occurs and when
it does the amount harm it will cause is not really predictable.
Moreover, it is especially worrying to insurers that the catastrophe
might occur markedly earlier than expected, so that not enough
premiums would yet have been accumulated, thereby putting an
insurer at risk of insolvency. Even if the timing and scale of the risk
were reasonably predictable, however, insuring against infrequent
disasters would require a long accumulation and investment of
premium income in a way that is not altogether attractive to insurers
(and re-insurers who might be enticed to spread the risk beyond the
insurer who initially sold coverage to its customers). Among other
things, U.S. tax law rules discourage insurance lines that involve
premium collection without payouts, even if funds are set aside for
eventual losses. Besides, when the gigantic-loss event finally occurs,
insurers could be swamped by the claims-handling process, having to
rely on out-of-area and/or inexperienced staff who are likely to be
more costly and less efficient. As a result, catastrophic risk coverage
might simply be an unattractive product for mainstream insurers to
offer.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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uncertain losses than smaller, but more certain, ones.166 The insurance
industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for large-scale natural
disasters. This reluctance may be in part because of the difficulty of
assessing risk levels,167 as well as the underwriting costs associated with
maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance, not to mention
competition from various government-subsidized schemes.168
The federal flood insurance program is based in part on the
reluctance of the private market to provide such insurance on a broad
scale. To fill similar gaps in insurance coverage, state governments have
also sometimes stepped in. For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew, Florida established a backup fund for individuals who could
not get private coverage, funded by assessments of insurers. (This bears
some resemblance to the more familiar “designated risk” pool for car
insurance.) The number of policy holders dropped by over ninety
percent in just a few years, but the remaining coverage still represented
over ten billion dollars in exposure. Florida also offers reinsurance to
private insurers at subsidized rates.169 These solutions, however, are not
entirely satisfactory:
Private losses from catastrophes in the United States
have been rising faster than premiums, population, and
economic activity, and are correlated with a rising rate of
impairments, or conditions where insurers’ liabilities
exceed their assets. In Florida and Louisiana alone,
more than 600,000 homeowners’ property policies were
cancelled or not renewed in 2005. The U.S. residual
markets – state-mandated pools where commercial
markets otherwise fail – contain about three million
customers today, and the number is rising. If the
situation is left unchecked, even more of the burden will
shift to consumers and governments and growth of the
insurance sector itself could be slowed.170

Faure, supra note 146, at 346.
Id. at 348.
168
For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann
O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging
Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1821–33 (2007) (stressing the difficulty of
quantifying risks as an explanation).
169
For discussion of the Florida programs, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10, at 345–47.
170
Christina Ross, Evan Mills, & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse:
Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26A STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 251, 257 (2007). See also Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Facing Mother
166
167
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The government has also supported insurance for terrorism risks.
For instance, in Britain and Holland, the government provides
reinsurance for terrorism risks.171 The German government covers losses
from three billion euros up to ten billion.172 Before 9/11, private
insurance for terrorist risks was commonly available, but private
insurers then withdrew from the market. (By 2003, property and
business interruption insurance claims filed as a result of 9/11 had
reached almost $20 billion.173) As a result, the federal government
became a reinsurer via the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.174
Whether this reinsurance function is desirable is far from clear.
The upshot of all of this is that private insurance markets do not
operate well, and may not operate at all, for catastrophic risks.
Government interventions have had some success in keeping insurance
markets operative with the help of implicit subsidies such as government
reinsurance. But we do not know how to create a truly satisfactory,
efficient, and equitable mechanism for insuring against catastrophic
risks.
In this setting, the risk-spreading function of tort law attains
heightened importance. If private firms have tort liability, the burden is
put on the shareholders and thereby spread through the securities
markets. If government agencies have tort liability, the burden is put on
the taxpayers and again shared widely. To the extent that private
insurers are in the market, the burden of covering catastrophic risks can
be reduced if they are allowed to subrogate to the tort claims of their
insureds. In any event, to a much greater extent than is true of more
easily insurable risks, such as routine auto accidents or house fires, the
tort system’s ability to spread risks is a major advantage.
The importance of catastrophe liability as a means of risk spreading
also counters the argument that we should avoid placing crushing
burdens on organizations. This may be true in other circumstances
because there are superior ways of distributing risks. But in the case of
catastrophic risks, satisfactory alternatives may not exist, and liability
can allow society to tap the unmatched ability of the securities markets
to spread risk broadly.
Some may fear that this liability will push businesses into
bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy poses risks to stakeholders, such as

Nature, REG. 28, 32 (Fall 2007) (“Writing homeowners insurance in Florida has been a losing
proposition that is getting worse, not better.”).
171
See Faure, supra note 146, at 357.
172
See id.
173
See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10, at 326.
174
See id. at 325.
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employees, the bankruptcy laws do allow otherwise viable business
entities to reorganize and continue operation, protecting employees and
other stakeholders.
Shareholder value may be wiped out, but
shareholders have access to the biggest risk spreading mechanism in
human history: modern international financial markets. They can hold
diversified stock portfolios or otherwise hedge against risk. (As recent
events in the financial markets indicate, this form of risk-spreading is not
absolutely foolproof, but it works well except in the case of rare financial
meltdowns—and during meltdowns, the added risk from potential
corporate tort liability is trivial compared with the losses from market
fluctuations.) Thus, transferring risk to shareholders from disaster
victims is not something that we should fear. The risk that third-parties
such as employees may be harmed by bankruptcy should not be
dismissed, but we should not confuse the need to protect such innocent
parties with the interests of shareholders who are often in a much better
position to diversify risks than the victims of catastrophic risks.
In sum, imposing liability for catastrophic risks can serve the goals of
deterring undesirable conduct and can also reinforce society’s otherwise
limited ability to spread the costs of catastrophe through private or
governmental insurance. Because the important defendants will nearly
always be organizations, the applicability of corrective justice depends
on our willingness to hold stakeholders, such as current shareholders or
taxpayers, responsible for the sins of the organization.
IV. NAVIGATING THE PITFALLS: JUDICIAL COMPETENCE, MANAGEABILITY,
AND PROOF
The asbestos cases are all the warning we could ask of the difficulties
that catastrophic risks can pose for the judicial system. Improvements in
civil procedure may ameliorate these difficulties, but we should also
consider other possible options. One option is to move compensation
away from the judiciary to an administrative agency; another is to craft
liability rules that reduce manageability issues.
Even if an
administrative system would be better than processing claims through
case-by-case litigation, judicial liability may be better than nothing and
may actually be a stepping stone toward an administrative or quasiadministrative system. Judicial findings of liability could lead to the
establishment of an administrative compensation scheme, either by
creating pressure for legislative action or by leading a court to create
some quasi-administrative mechanism with which to provide class relief
in the remedy phase.
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A. Administrative Compensation Schemes
The desirability of compensation does not necessarily mean that a
judicial forum is optimal. A legislatively established administrative
system might offer several advantages over courts.175 It could operate
under a more comprehensive set of rules. Transaction costs could be
lower because agency expertise would produce more efficient decisions.
It might also be easier for an agency to produce standardized protocols
and payment schedules, which would also simplify the adjudicatory
process.176
Although some features of the system were unique, the 9/11 fund
provides one model of an administrative compensation scheme.177 Such
schemes provide a mechanism for social risk-spreading. Where the
government is in part to blame for an event, such schemes may also
175
See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993) for a discussion of the issues involved in
designing such a system.
176
The ABA has recommended the use of administrative compensation, but largely as a
back-up for judicial remedies rather than a substitute:
Government payment of compensation or additional assistance to
persons affected by a major disaster should be considered when
government is either implicated in the major disaster or public
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so. Principles
of equal treatment, due process and transparency should govern the
distribution of compensation and disaster assistance.
American Bar Association, Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster, Principle 7 (2007),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ruleoflaw/rol_disaster.pdf.
The
commentary explains:
In cases where neither insurance coverage nor judicial action is
likely to provide reimbursement for losses to persons affected by a
major disaster, public authorities should consider providing
reasonable compensation or additional disaster assistance to
individual persons affected by a major disaster for losses when public
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so, for
example, where public authorities are responsible, through their action
or inaction, for the disaster event or where public authorities
determine that a remedy traditionally available either through the
operation of the judicial system or otherwise should not be made
available or should be severely curtailed. In such cases public
authorities may provide for alternatives to judicial action to determine
eligibility and fix awards. Public authorities should also be free to
offer to persons affected by a major disaster, on a voluntary basis, a fair
alternative to judicial action for the resolution of claims or the award of
assistance.
Id.
177
For a recent appraisal of the fund, see Robert L. Rabin & Stephen Sugarman, The Case
for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts: An Assessment, available at
ssrn.com/abstract=1097674.
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provide a form of corrective justice, at least if we believe that the
citizenry should take responsibility for the actions of their agents. On
the other hand, an administrative compensation system would not
penalize negligence by private parties who failed to take precautions
against terrorism or other catastrophic events. Thus, an administrative
system is best at risk-spreading, but not so good at deterrence or
corrective justice unless the cost is shifted to the culpable parties.
Climate change might provide one setting for an administrative
solution. In a previous article, I suggested the following possible
scheme.178 A commission would receive claims from countries that have
incurred adaptation expenses, such as strengthening sea walls or
providing alternative sources of ecosystem services to replace lost
wetlands. The commission would determine which adaptation expenses
were reasonable, and would schedule them for compensation.
Compensation might come directly from an international fund, but an
alternative payment system might be more appealing if an international
trading system for greenhouse gases was in place. In this alternative
way of financing compensation, a set number of greenhouse gas
allowances could be set aside for the commission’s use. The commission
would use these allowances to pay claims; in turn, the claimants could
sell them to greenhouse gas emitters on the open market. The net effect
would be that the sources doing the least to reduce their emission levels,
which would have the greatest need to purchase additional emission
permits, would indirectly provide compensation for the expenses of
adaptation.
If an administrative compensation public risk is desired, should
there be a permanent scheme for compensating public risks, or should ad
hoc schemes be established after the fact? There are several arguments
in favor of permanent compensation schemes providing umbrella
coverage (or at least a default framework) for catastrophic risks. One
argument for a permanent umbrella scheme is equity between victims.
For example, the German government provided up to 8.1 billion euros in
compensation for victims of a flood, but failed to provide similar
compensation for victims of other disasters.179 Special funds were
established in the Netherlands following a disease outbreak, a fire in a
bar, and an explosion in a fireworks facility, with different procedures
and levels of compensation for each of the three funds.180 Similarly, it
seems unjust that the 9/11 victims had the right to obtain government

178
179
180

See Farber, supra note 85.
See Faure, supra note 146, at 353.
See id. at 356.
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compensation, but not the victims of the Oklahoma City terrorist
bombing.
Moreover, establishing a permanent scheme avoids the need for
political wrangling about compensation after each event. Even if new
legislation is required, having an established default scheme provides a
framework for bargaining and should streamline consideration of
legislative changes to deal with a particular catastrophic event.
On the other hand, the ex ante assurance of government
compensation is clearly fatal to any possible private insurance market—
as one scholar has said, “Solidarity kills market insurance.”181 Whether
this is a serious problem depends on whether a viable insurance market
is actually possible. But, as seen earlier, it is not clear whether private
insurance markets for public risks are viable anyway. Advance
assurance of compensation may also encourage forms of moral hazard,
such as building in high-risk areas. Thus, a government compensation
scheme may need to be coupled with some form of risk regulation or
funded through risk-adjusted premiums.
As a practical matter, it may be difficult to establish a permanent
compensation system for political reasons, and also because public risks
vary so much in their characteristics. A compensation system for
earthquakes would look very different from a compensation system for
climate change. Ad hoc administrative systems remain a possibility.
Their drawbacks are their unequal treatment of victims of different
public risks and the potential for interest group influence on their
formulation and implementation.
Litigation may have problems of its own, but does not suffer from
these defects. Moreover, without the threat of litigation, the impetus for
a legislative solution may not exist. Thus, initial resort to the courts may
be a catalyst for a more satisfactory long-term solution, and may, in any
event, be the only practical route for victims.
B. The Feasibility of Judicial Remedies
But can courts handle these cases? The manageability of claims
depends in part on substantive law rather than procedure. Thus, we
should consider how to shape liability rules for catastrophic risks that
are both defensible on their own terms and conducive to effective
procedural resolution. It is clear that much more work needs to be done
in this realm, but a few preliminary thoughts are in order.
To begin, there should be a general presumption in favor of
preventive relief, as exemplified by medical monitoring or removal of
181
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hazardous substances. This form of relief has three key advantages.
First, it obviates the need to engage in difficult individualized inquiries
into whether individualized harms were caused by the defendant’s
conduct. Second, it does not raise the specter of unlimited, uninsurable
liability for defendants, because preventive efforts are more easily
forecast and generally lower than the ultimate damage to individuals
that would result without precautions. Third, because preventive
measures will be taken sooner, continuity of ownership is likely to be
greater. At the time preventive measures are required, more of the
stakeholders will have benefited from, or contributed to, the wrongful
conduct, as opposed to the situation some years later, when catastrophic
harm might typically eventuate.
Furthermore, when limiting the class of victims is necessary for
manageability and fairness, the first priority should be the victims with
the most catastrophic losses. This point is based on the significance of
catastrophic risk liability as a form of risk-spreading, and it is those with
the most severe harms who are most in need of insurance. Given
equivalent losses, poorer individuals are more in need of insurance than
richer ones. Thus, the families of the deceased, and individuals facing a
risk of death, should recover before those with property losses or less
drastic health effects. Similarly, those whose property is destroyed
should get higher priority than those who suffer a lesser diminution in
value. And losses that are otherwise covered by the insurance system
should have lower priority than those that are not.
We should also favor claims where the causal connection applies
generally to a class of victims, versus situations where the causal
connection is highly individualized. The reason is obvious in terms of
procedural manageability.
Turning from the plaintiffs to the defendants, courts should also be
more inclined to impose liability for catastrophic risks where the
defendants were negligent, or at least where the danger was known to
them. This is important for deterrence purposes; it also bolsters
whatever argument for corrective justice may apply. This should not be
an absolute bar to stricter forms of liability, particularly when there are
many individual defendants and it would be difficult or impossible to
assess their individual culpability. It may also make sense to shift the
burden of proof regarding culpability or liability shares to the
defendants in order to expedite the litigation.
Under the best of circumstances, liability claims involving billions of
dollars will pose challenges to judges and litigants. Procedural
innovations can help, and so can sensitivity to manageability concerns in
crafting liability rules. Manageability may sometimes require curtailing
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the class of victims or the form of relief, though courts should not jump
to the conclusion without careful consideration of potential procedural
solutions.
In any event, manageability should rarely provide a
justification for blanket immunity to entities that are responsible for
causing catastrophic losses to others.
One of the positive lessons of the Strauss case is that we are not faced
with an all-or-nothing choice. It may not be feasible to compensate all
victims of catastrophic risks. Perhaps they are difficult to identify, or
their damages are hard to assess, or their numbers would overwhelm the
judicial system’s procedural capacities, or the burden of liability would
fall unfairly on innocent parties. Nevertheless, the unavailability of full
compensation does not mean that all compensation should be denied.
Strauss created a kind of triage rule, identifying a subclass of victims
(those in privity of contract with the utility) whose claims seemed
particularly deserving to the court. Although this truncation of the
compensated group may not have been warranted, it does at least
establish the possibility of cutting potentially unmanageable cases down
to size. Providing partial relief to only some victims is not ideal, but it is
better than providing zero relief to any victims.
V. CONCLUSION
In tort law, “big” is not necessarily “bad.” The scale of litigation is
not by itself a reason for courts to flinch. As the Restatement observes,
“courts must be sensitive to the fact that some tortuous conduct may
threaten, in a very clear way, massive harm and that merely the fact that
the scope of liability is huge is not, of itself, a ground for imposing limits
on it.”182 We have seen that there may be good reasons for imposing

Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra note 69, at 599 (§ 29, comment m). The Strauss case
is ironic in this respect:
At base, the court feared that requiring compensation of all victims
could bankrupt the company, disrupt its operations, and quite possibly
result in the denial of the public of its basic need for electricity. This is
an instance in which, had there merely been a single victim who was
not a Con Edison customer (for example, a tenant whose electricity is
paid for by the landlord), then (under the same facts) that victim
clearly would have been able to recover compensation from the utility.
Rather perversely, then, the fact that so many were harmed was what
allowed the defendant to escape legal responsibility. (A different
justification for this result might be that, when catastrophic results
occur, if the defendant has to pay for all of the foreseeable
consequences of its misconduct, this would be excessive
“punishment.” Yet, tort law normally does not require any relationship
between the degree of fault and the amount of liability.)

182
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liability for catastrophic events on businesses or governments in terms of
deterrence, risk-spreading, and perhaps to a lesser extent, corrective
justice.
Too often, I believe, students leave their introductory tort courses
with the sense that tort law is mostly a subject for personal injury
lawyers and insurance companies, having little bearing on broader social
problems. Providing compensation for victims of accidents, defective
products, and malpractice is an important social goal, as is safeguarding
valuable social activities against excessive liability. Thus, “everyday”
tort law is important to society, not just to particular segments of the bar.
In this sense, tort law is part of public law, not merely concerned with
settling disputes between individuals fairly.183
But the significance of tort law is even broader. More importantly
still, I believe, tort law can be relevant to some of the largest and most
dramatic issues facing our society. Of course, tort law is not the only tool
we have to use against threats such as terrorism, public health hazards,
and climate change.
It is not even the most important tool.
Nevertheless, it can be a key part of our toolkit for responding to
catastrophic risks.

Sugarman, supra note 165, at 10–11. The courts’ fear of bankrupting the company maybe
excessive since Chapter 11 is designed to allow companies to continue operations and
reorganize; in addition, bankruptcy risks are easily diversified through the securities
markets. This is not to say bankruptcy poses no risks, and clearly innocent parties, such as
workers or other creditors, may be harmed.
183
This public law perspective on torts, I believe, is the fundamental lesson of Guido
Calabresi’s classic Cost of Accidents, although it is probably remembered more often for
introducing economic analysis into tort law.
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